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[P]eople will be surprised at the eagerness with which we 
went about pretending to rouse from its slumber a sexuality 
which everything—our discourses, our customs, our institutions, 
our regulations, our knowledges—was busy producing in the 
light of day and broadcasting to noisy accompaniment. 
–Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality1
  INTRODUCTION   
 
The phone call changed Hollie Toups’s life, and not for the 
better. 
On the other end of the line, a friend told her, “I overheard 
some people talking about a website. Its [sic] pictures, you 
know, explicit photos that people have posted . . . [and] you’re 
on there.”2 A former boyfriend had uploaded naked photos of 
Toups to a website specializing in revenge porn—the practice of 
disclosing nude or sexually explicit images and videos, often 
along with identifying personal information, of former romantic 
partners without their consent.3 In Toups’s case, the photos 
were accompanied by a link to her Facebook profile, along with 
her name.4
Toups had intended the photos solely for her then-
boyfriend. When he shared the images without her consent, 
though, they became widely known. Toups, who is from a small 
town in Texas, found that “the website was flooded with people 
that I knew . . . . Those of us on there go to the grocery store 
 
 
 1. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
158 (1978). 
 2. Women’s Outrage After Ex-Boyfriends Post Revenge Photos, ABC NEWS 
(Jan. 25, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/01/ 
womens-outrage-after-ex-boyfriends-post-nude-photos (quoting Hollie Toups). 
 3. See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 
655, 681 (2012); Women Sue Explicit “Revenge Porn” Site After Jilted Lovers 
Anonymously Posted Revealing Pictures of Them, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 26, 2013, 
6:47 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2268476/Ex-plicit-revenge 
-porn-site-allowed-jilted-lovers-anonymously-post-revealing-pics-girlfriends 
-facing-class-action-suit.html.  
 4. Jessica Roy, Victims of Revenge Porn Mount Class Action Suit Against 
GoDaddy and Texxxan.com, BETABEAT (Jan. 21, 2013, 10:58 AM), http:// 
betabeat.com/2013/01/victims-of-revenge-porn-mount-class-action-suit-against 
-godaddy-and-texxxan-com.  
  
2014] EXPOSED 2027 
 
and everybody recognizes you.”5 Her experience is increasingly 
common, both in her desire to share intimate photos with a 
partner, and in the subsequent unauthorized distribution of 
those photos. Surveys by researcher Holly Jacobs found that 
over half (53.3%) of heterosexual respondents had shared a 
nude photo with someone else, and nearly three-quarters 
(74.8%) of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) re-
spondents had done so.6 In one study, 44% of teenage males re-
ported having viewed at least one nude photo of a female 
classmate.7 A survey by the National Campaign to Prevent 
Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy found that 20% of teenagers 
ages 13–19 had sent or posted nude or semi-nude images or 
videos of themselves; the rate rose to 33% for young adults ages 
20–26.8
Unauthorized distribution of intimate images and videos is 
also frequent. The now-defunct revenge porn site IsAnyoneUp? 
featured images of thousands of people and, at its height of 
popularity, received 30 million page views per month.
  
9 The 
site’s proprietor, Hunter Moore, claimed to have received 
10,000 images in the first three months of operation.10
 
 5. Abby Rogers, More than 20 Women Are Suing a Texas “Revenge Porn” 
Site and GoDaddy, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:38 AM), http://www 
.businessinsider.com/class-action-lawsuit-against-texxxancom-2013-1. 
 Jacobs’s 
 6. E-mail from Holly Jacobs to Derek Bambauer (June 28, 2013) [herein-
after Jacobs E-mail] (on file with author). The research is from Holly Jacobs, 
An Examination of Psychological Meaningfulness, Safety, and Availability as 
the Underlying Mechanisms linking Job Features and Personal Characteris-
tics to Work Engagement (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) [hereinafter Jacobs 
Dissertation], available at http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/904. Jacobs’ dis-
sertation examined the element of work engagement in an organizational set-
ting. She assessed the effects that job features and personal characteristics 
have on work engagement through the psychological conditions of meaning-
fulness, safety, and availability. 
 7. Alexandra Marks, Charges Against “Sexting” Teenagers Highlight Le-
gal Gaps, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 2 (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.csmonitor 
.com/Innovation/Responsible-Tech/2009/0330/charges-against-sexting 
-teenagers-highlight-legal-gaps (quoting WIRED SAFETY, https://www.wired 
safety.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2014)). 
 8. Julie Baumgardner, Teen Pregnancy Prevention, FIRST THINGS FIRST, 
http://firstthings.org/teen-pregnancy-prevention-1 (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 9. Memphis Barker, “Revenge Porn” Is No Longer a Niche Activity Which 
Victimises Only Celebrities—The Law Must Intervene, INDEPENDENT (May 19, 
2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/revenge-porn-is-no 
-longer-a-niche-activity-which-victimises-only-celebrities--the-law-must 
-intervene-8622574.html. 
 10. Kashmir Hill, Revenge Porn with a Facebook Twist, FORBES (July 6, 
2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07/06/revenge 
-porn-with-a-facebook-twist. 
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research found that 22.1% of heterosexual respondents, and 
23.3% of LGBT ones, had been the victims of unauthorized dis-
tribution.11
Legal scholars have just begun to grapple with the issues 
surrounding production and distribution of intimate photos and 
videos. Most have turned instinctively to privacy as the doc-
trine best able to regulate intimate media, focusing principally 
on the prevention of non-consensual distribution. For example, 
Mary Anne Franks treats revenge porn as part of on-line sexual 
harassment.
 People increasingly share intimate media—nude or 
sexually explicit photos or videos—with their partners. And, 
those partners increasingly betray that trust by sharing those 
media without consent. 
12 Danielle Citron proposes an amendment to Sec-
tion 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which immunizes 
Internet sites for tortious third-party content, that would re-
move sites designed to facilitate illegal conduct, or used princi-
pally for such conduct, from its safe harbor.13 Similarly, Nancy 
Kim would alter Section 230 to impose proprietor-style liability 
on website sponsors whose sites are used for cyber-
harassment.14 Anupam Chander looks to a reinvigorated tort of 
public disclosure of private facts as one solution.15 Martha 
Nussbaum views the problem as the on-line, pornographic ob-
jectification of women; she suggests that changes in cultural 
norms (in particular, the culture of masculinity) are the key to 
ameliorating it.16 Eric Goldman proposes a privacy-related con-
sent and take-down system for sex tapes.17
 
 11. Jacobs Dissertation, supra note 
 And Ariel 
6. 
 12. Franks, supra note 3, at 681. 
 13. Danielle Citron, Revenge Porn and the Uphill Battle to Pierce Section 
230 Immunity (Part II), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 25, 2013, 3:30PM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/01/revenge-porn-and-the 
-uphill-battle-to-pierce-section-230-immunity-part-ii.html. Section 230 is codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); see infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 14. Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 
UTAH L. REV. 993, 1034–44. 
 15. Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE 
OFFENSIVE INTERNET 124, 129–33 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum 
eds., 2010). 
 16. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE 
OFFENSIVE INTERNET, supra note 15, at 68, 84–87. 
 17. Eric Goldman, The Sex Tape Problem… and a Possible Legislative So-
lution?, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 11, 2008, 10:38 AM), http://blog 
.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/07/the_sex_tape_pr.htm (noting that, while 
Goldman favors a limited solution, “the most obvious problem is that this 
would proliferate yet another limited privacy law as a point solution to a spe-
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Ronneburger would establish a notice and take-down regime, 
similar to that of Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA), to deal with what she calls “Porn 2.0.”18
Surprisingly, though, current privacy law provides few if 
any effective remedies for people whose intimate media are dis-
tributed without authorization. They can sue the person who 
uploaded the photos (typically a former partner) under a host of 
theories: disclosure of private facts,
  
19 false light, breach of im-
plied confidentiality,20 perhaps defamation,21 perhaps 
cyberstalking.22 These remedies are effective against the person 
initially disclosing the media. But, these claims cannot reach 
the true source of the problem: ongoing Internet distribution of 
intimate media. For most people whose photos or videos have 
been shared without consent, the principal harm is not the dis-
closure by a former partner: that relationship is past. Rather, 
the injury occurs from the ongoing, repeated dissemination of 
the sensitive content. For Toups, the difficulty was not that an 
ex had betrayed her; rather, it was that anyone she met might 
have viewed the images he uploaded.23 Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act immunizes web hosts and other 
interactive computer services from most third-party tort liabil-
ity.24
 
cific problem instead of providing a more comprehensive omnibus privacy reg-
ulatory scheme preferred by privacy advocates”). 
 It shields even sites that encourage users to upload inti-
 18. Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and Webpages: Creating a Legal 
Remedy for Victims of Porn 2.0, 2009 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 28–30. 
 19. See, e.g., Petition for Damages and Class Action Certification, Toups v. 
GoDaddy.com, No. D130018-C (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 18, 2013), 2013 WL 271500 
(listing causes of action including invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclu-
sion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, appropriation of name or 
likeness, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 20. Woodrow Hartzog, How to Fight Revenge Porn, ATLANTIC (May 10, 
2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/how 
-to-fight-revenge-porn/275759. 
 21. Cf. Mary Flood, Web Post on Herpes at Center of Woman’s Lawsuit, 
HOUS. CHRON., May 7, 2009, http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pasadena 
-news/article/Web-post-on-herpes-at-center-of-woman-s-lawsuit-1729971.php. 
 22. See, e.g., Criminal Complaint, U.S. v. Savader, No. 2:13-mj-30236-JU 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/137623866/US-v-Adam 
-Savader-Complaint; Roy, supra note 4. 
 23. See, e.g., Roy, supra note 4; Jessica Roy, A Victim Speaks: Standing 
Up to a Revenge Porn Tormentor, BETABEAT (May 1, 2013, 1:04 PM), http:// 
betabeat.com/2013/05/revenge-porn-holli-thometz-criminal-case. 
 24. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). See generally David S. Ardia, Free Speech Sav-
ior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L. REV. 373 
(2010). 
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mate media without authorization, or that refuse to remove 
such content.25 Legal theories that hold the initial source ac-
countable provide little comfort if they fail to prevent further 
dissemination.26
Using privacy law to address issues surrounding intimate 
media reveals only half of the picture—a privacy approach con-
centrates on the risks of this content and ignores its potential 
rewards. Strikingly, scholars have failed to assess the potential 
for intellectual property (IP) law to regulate the production and 
distribution of intimate media (except by obviating IP protec-
tion).
 The likely result, as revenge porn gains in-
creasing media attention, is that people will forgo consensual 
sharing of intimate media out of fear. 
27 Indeed, this author’s suggestion that copyright law 
might be used in such a fashion provoked noted copyright ex-
pert Rebecca Tushnet to respond that “concern for the victims 
of these reprehensible [revenge porn] sites is understandable, 
but distorting copyright law is not the right solution.”28 That 
response, though, begs the question: what is the proper role for 
copyright law in regulating production of intimate photos and 
videos?29 Legal scholarship typically treats intellectual property 
systems as the default choice to structure how expressive con-
tent is produced, distributed, and consumed—why should inti-
mate media be an exception?30
 
 25. See, e.g., Global Royalties v. XCentric Ventures, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 
933 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“It is obvious that a website entitled Ripoff Report encour-
ages the publication of defamatory content . . . . However, there is no authority 
for the proposition that this makes the website operator responsible, in whole 
or in part, for the ‘creation or development’ of every post on the site.”). 
 Intellectual property law is both 
 26. This Article discusses privacy law and criminal law approaches in 
Part IV infra, and sets forth reasons why they are less effective than a copy-
right-based approach. 
 27. Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 44–
46 (2012) (proposing to deny copyright protection to revenge porn, and sug-
gesting, as a second-best alternative, vesting copyright in the victim rather 
than in the person capturing the image or video). Bartow concedes that her 
primary approach, which would enable distribution without risk of infringe-
ment, is not likely to curb dissemination of revenge porn, but argues for her 
proposal as an expressive matter. Id. at 45–46. 
 28. Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Dis-
embodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1001, 1030 (2013). 
 29. “Distort” implies a deviation from a desired baseline. Tushnet’s article 
does not identify such a baseline, though clearly it is at odds with the frame-
work proposed here. Ironically, the Tushnet article’s approach to copyright’s 
authorship doctrine is functionalist: “Authorship moves around as needed to 
meet the needs of the industry.” Id. at 1021. 
 30. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual 
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 274–80, 282 (2012) (critiquing the “reflexive 
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likely to be effective in shaping the generation of intimate me-
dia, and overlooked as a candidate for that role.31
This Article is the first to propose bringing the production 
of intimate media within the ambit of intellectual property law. 
It contends that the consensual production and distribution of 
intimate media is normatively desirable—it brings people, par-
ticularly those in intimate relationships, closer together, and 
allows them to express romantic and sexual feelings in new 
ways.
 
32 Intimate media are an important exemplar of non-
commercial amateur production of expressive content.33 How-
ever, the risk of non-consensual distribution or display threat-
ens to undercut the generation of intimate media.34 A romantic 
partner is likely to be unwilling to produce such images or vid-
eo if she fears that, should the media be shared without her 
consent, she will have no ability to use legal means to counter-
act that distribution.35
Tailoring copyright law to encourage production of inti-
mate media is both normatively desirable and entirely in keep-
ing with copyright’s pattern of media and industry-specific ad-
 In particular, copyright doctrine can en-
courage production and dissemination, through legitimate 
channels, of this type of information by providing potent reme-
dies against improper distribution. 
 
strengthening of existing intellectual property regimes to facilitate commer-
cialization”). 
 31. Litigators employ IP-based claims on occasion when dealing with un-
authorized distribution of intimate media. See, e.g., Complaint, Middleton v. 
Bollaert, No. 13-11968-cv (E.D. Mich. May 2, 2013) (asserting claim for copy-
right infringement), http://bv.1110.cds.contentcolo.net/uploads/files/ 
Lindsay%20Middleton%20%20Complaint%20-%20Filed%20Version.pdf. I 
thank Erica Johnstone for this reference. 
 32. See generally Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing legal doctrine should recognize the value of sexual 
intimacy and pleasure). 
 33. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, Or, Linux and the Na-
ture of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing rise of peer production). 
 34. See Richard Morgan, Revenge Porn, DETAILS.COM (2008), http://www 
.details.com/sex-relationships/porn-and-perversions/200809/revenge-porn 
(quoting CEO of ReputationDefender that “[t]he best advice, of course, is to 
never, ever create sexual photos, videos, e-mails, text messages, or anything 
else that someone could keep and share in the future”). 
 35. See, e.g., Susanna Lichter, Unwanted Exposure: Civil and Criminal 
Liability for Revenge Porn Hosts and Posters, HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIG. (May 
28, 2013), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/unwanted-exposure-civil 
-and-criminal-liability-for-revenge-porn-hosts-and-posters (describing legal 
hurdles to forcing websites to remove unauthorized intimate media). 
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justment.36 Counterintuitively, creating sufficient incentives to 
produce requires recognizing the interests of people captured in 
these videos or photos. The greatest risk to production comes 
from subjects’ fears about improper dissemination. Providing 
legal protection that enables them to block non-consensual dis-
tribution is thus a generative move.37 This Article proposes cre-
ating a new right for people who appear in, and can be reason-
ably identified by, intimate media: the right to prevent 
distribution or display of those media without their consent.38
More abstractly, approaching intimate media issues from a 
copyright perspective highlights important doctrinal tensions, 
particularly regarding the allocation of rights via the definition 
of authorship and clashes with the First Amendment. On these 
fronts, the Article’s proposal is provocative: it presses against 
the boundaries of authorship and free speech limits to test how 
stringent they are. It argues that each concept constrains copy-
right law less than is commonly believed. That result is useful 
for intimate media, but may be troublesome for copyright more 
generally—a problem beyond this Article’s scope. 
 It 
justifies that proposal normatively by describing the value of 
consensual production and distribution, which is threatened by 
infringement.  
Five further parts comprise this Article. First, it describes 
the benefits that flow from consensual sharing of intimate me-
dia, the harms worked by unauthorized distribution, and the 
concomitant risks to production. Then, the Article offers its 
proposal: creation of a new negative right vested in identifiable 
subjects of intimate media over distribution and display. Next, 
it uses intimate media to explore doctrinal puzzles in copyright 
related to authorship and free expression. The Article con-
cludes by arguing that regulation of intimate media offers a 
valuable case study for addressing the challenges wrought by a 
 
 36. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012) (creating compulsory license for 
musical compositions embodied in publicly-distributed phonorecords); id. 
§ 106A (creating waivable, but inalienable, rights of attribution and integrity 
for authors of works of visual art); id. § 120 (limiting copyright entitlements 
for architectural works). See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
35–38 (2001). 
 37. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 2–18 (2008) 
(describing generativity). 
 38. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (enabling authors of works of visual art 
to prevent their intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification if prejudi-
cial to the author’s reputation and, for works of recognized stature, to prevent 
their destruction). 
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technological environment where the costs of producing and 
distributing information have plummeted to nearly zero. 
I.  BENEFITS AND HARMS OF INTIMATE MEDIA   
While the harms of revenge porn have increasingly attract-
ed media attention, the benefits of consensual sharing of inti-
mate photos and videos are largely overlooked. This Section de-
scribes the benefits that can accrue to partners who willingly 
share these media with one another as part of sexual or emo-
tional intimacy. These gains justify deploying copyright law as 
a means of protecting them, and of encouraging production of 
more intimate media. Then, the Section describes how unau-
thorized distribution not only threatens to work a forfeiture of 
these rewards, but also risks causing both utilitarian and de-
ontological harms to the subjects of intimate media. Non-
consensual sharing—which would count as copyright infringe-
ment under this Article’s proposal—creates real losses to those 
who appear in explicit photos or videos, and the risk of those 
harms threatens to deter socially valuable production of ex-
pression. 
A. SEXTING’S VIRTUES  
The consensual production and sharing of intimate media 
offer significant social value, such that these activities warrant 
expanded copyright protection to foster them. The exchange of 
intimate media between consenting partners benefits those in-
volved. It enables them to engage in pleasurable sexual activi-
ty, which creates both individual and societal benefits.39 It al-
lows partners to remain intimate even while separated in space 
or time.40 The practice can help people to overcome inhibitions 
and feel better able to express attraction and other sexual feel-
ings.41
 
 39. See Kaplan, supra note 
 Qualitative research suggests that sharing sexually pro-
vocative images can increase confidence, encourage partners to 
experiment with new behavior, and build anticipation for other 
32. 
 40. See, e.g., Jessica Leshnoff, Sexting Not Just for Kids, AARP (June 
2011), http://www.aarp.org/relationships/love-sex/info-11-2009/sexting_not_ 
just_for_kids.html (describing a relationship coach whose client was “a wife 
who enjoys sexting her husband while he's traveling on business, telling (and 
showing) him what he's missing at home”). 
 41. Id. (quoting psychotherapist Dr. Jonathan Alpert). 
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sexual activity.42 This type of intimacy is increasingly common. 
A 2012 survey of 5,000 single adults in the U.S. by dating site 
Match.com found that 57% of men and 45% of women had re-
ceived an intimate image via mobile phone (a “sext”).43 Thirty-
five percent of the women, and 38% of the men, had sent a sext, 
even though 72% recognized the practice carried some career 
risk, and 75% thought it could create reputation risk.44 The 
practice crosses generational boundaries; it is increasingly 
common among seniors, for example.45
Moreover, use of intimate media may be particularly im-
portant for people with minority sexual preferences, or who are 
uncertain about what their preferences are.
 
46 The greater ano-
nymity and psychological distance provided by this type of 
communication can be useful to those concerned about being 
identified with a particular preference.47 Production of consen-
sual intimate media allows people to challenge prevailing gen-
der norms and communication patterns, and to take some con-
trol over self-representation.48 Empirical data support the 
contention that use of intimate media is more prevalent (and 
thus likely important) among communities with minority sexu-
al preferences. Survey data collected by researcher Holly Ja-
cobs finds that the creation and use of intimate media is much 
more prevalent for LGBT respondents than it is for heterosex-
ual ones.49 Jacobs surveyed 691 participants, 488 self-identified 
as heterosexual, and 103 as LGBT.50
 
 42. Yvonne K. Fulbright, Scintillating Sexting, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 14, 
2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mate-relate-and-communicate/20 
1209/scintillating-sexting. 
 In response to the ques-
tion, “Have you ever taken a nude photo/video of yourself and 
shared it with someone else?,” 53.3% of heterosexual partici-
 43. More on Sexting and Texting from SIA 3, UPTODATE (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://blog.match.com/2013/02/05/more-on-sexting-and-texting-from-sia-3. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Senior Sexting Gaining Steam, AZCENTRAL.COM (Feb. 8, 2010, 9:45 
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/offbeat/articles/2010/02/08/20100208seniors 
-sexting.html. 
 46. See Amy Adele Hasinoff, Sexting as Media Production: Rethinking so-
cial Media and Sexuality, 15 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 449, 457–58 (2012); Jeffrey 
G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
661, 702 (1995) (“[G]ay male pornography is a necessary tool in gay men's 
struggle to attain sexual integrity.”). 
 47. Hasinoff, supra note 46, at 455–56. 
 48. Id. at 456–57. 
 49. Jacobs E-mail, supra note 6. 
 50. Jacobs used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to conduct the survey. Id. 
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pants responded “Yes”—but 74.8% of LGBT ones replied af-
firmatively, a statistically significant difference.51 LGBT indi-
viduals were also more likely to have allowed someone else to 
take a nude photo or video of them; 49.5% had done so, com-
pared to 41.2% of heterosexual respondents (though this differ-
ence is not statistically significant).52 Interestingly, despite the 
higher rate of production of intimate media among LGBT par-
ticipants, they reported rates of unauthorized sharing (becom-
ing the victims of revenge porn) that were almost indistin-
guishable from heterosexual respondents: 23.3% LGBT, versus 
22.1% heterosexual.53 While the use of intimate media is in-
creasingly common overall, it appears to be particularly salient 
for LGBT communities.54
Increasingly, mainstream media coverage and relationship 
advice laud the virtues of sharing intimate media. The Huffing-
ton Post, for example, mixes standard warnings about sexting 
with positive treatment from therapists like Esther Perel, who 
stated, “[s]ex and love online gives you [the ability] to express 
yourself in ways that you [normally] do not.”
  
55 And, Perel notes, 
intimate media can help rebuild as well as maintain relation-
ships: “[couples] can reconnect with the erotic dimension of 
their sexual relations. . . [it is] a very creative intervention for 
couples trying to rekindle their relationships.”56 Nickelodeon’s 
Parents Connect features an article on how to sext your spouse, 
including advice such as “Take a naughty picture of yourself 
with your phone’s camera and SMS it to your hubby. . . get racy 
and give him a peep at your delicious décolletage.”57
 
 51. Id. 
 The web-
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See generally Anne Collier, The Girls Are All Right: Girls Not as Vul-
nerable to Sexting as Media Says, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/Family/Modern-Parenthood/2013/0513/ 
The-girls-are-all-right-Girls-not-as-vulnerable-to-sexting-as-media-says (quot-
ing Australian researcher Nina Funnell that “taking and sharing nude images 
is an established courtship practice within many parts of the gay community 
and that apps such as Grindr have popularized the practice considerably”). 
 55. Emma Gray, Adult Sexting: Does It Help or Hurt Relationships?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/04/20/adult-sexting-relationships_n_1439404.html. 
 56. Id. 
 57. How to Spice Up a Relationship by Sexting Your Spouse, NICKELODE-
ON PARENTS CONNECT, http://www.parentsconnect.com/parents/relationships/ 
relationship-tips/spice-up-a-relationship/how-to-spice-up-a-relationship 
-sexting-spouse.html. The ParentsConnect website recently closed. See A 
ParentsConnect & NickMom Announcement: ParentsConnect Has Closed Its 
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site Couples Advice recommends the smartphone app Couple, 
which is a “private communication endeavor for couples” that 
lets you use instant messages and shared pictures to create “a 
sense of intimacy and closeness with your partner, even when 
they aren’t necessarily physically close.”58 Cosmopolitan sug-
gests that couples in long-distance relationships “make sure to 
keep things spicy, over text, the phone, and webcam.”59 Similar-
ly, the magazine suggests that such couples have a “Skype date 
and challenge [each other] to a strip poker tournament a 
deux.”60 Strip poker is tame compared to Cosmo’s later advice: 
“Light candles around your computer for a sexy-yet-romantic 
vibe the next time you have Skype sex.”61 A final example: 
AOL’s Relationships site—hardly a trend-setter—hosts a video 
entitled, “How To Have Intimate Relations Over the Phone.”62 
Put simply, intimate media have gone mainstream. Sharing 
such videos and photos increasingly is seen as a valued activity 
for consenting partners. As Bennett Capers writes, “the only 
people we seem to frown on for sexting are politicians.”63
And yet, the typical response to concerns about unauthor-
ized distribution of intimate media is technological abstinence: 
people simply should not create explicit photos or videos.
 
64
 
Doors, NICKMOM, http://www.nickmom.com/parentsconnect (last visited Apr. 
20, 2014). An archived version of the ParentsConnect article is available at the 
INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://web.archive.org/web/20130807074011/http://www 
.parentsconnect.com/parents/relationships/relationship-tips/spice-up-a 
-relationship/how-to-spice-up-a-relationship-sexting-spouse.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2014). 
 This 
 58. The Tech Spark: 5 Apps That Couples Can Use to Energize a Relation-
ship, COUPLES ADVICE, http://www.couplesadvice.com/the-tech-spark-5-apps 
-that-couples-can-use-to-energize-a-relationship (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 59. Cameron Cain, The Super Long Distance Relationship Survival Guide, 
COSMOPOLITAN (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sexlove/ 
relationship-advice/long-distance-sexy-texts#slide-4. To make the point clear, 
the accompanying photo shows a woman beginning to undress in front of a 
laptop. Id. 
 60. Korin Miller, 12 Ways to Keep Things Hot When You’re Apart, COSMO-
POLITAN, at slide 11 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sexlove/ 
dating-advice/long-distance-relationship-tips. 
 61. Id. slide 12. 
 62. How to Have Intimate Relations over the Phone, AOL ON RELATION-
SHIPS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://on.aol.com/video/how-to-have-intimate-relations 
-over-the-phone-517201183. 
 63. I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 878 
(2013). 
 64. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10 (noting that Internet law expert Eric 
Goldman “strongly advises against making sex tapes and taking nude photos 
as the best protection”); Morgan, supra note 34; Kristie Reeter, Experts Warn 
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advice is increasingly unrealistic—a substantial percentage of 
adults engage in such sharing, and the practice seems to be a 
majoritarian one in some LGBT communities. As feminist writ-
er Jill Filipovic notes, “[w]ithin romantic relationships, people 
have always exchanged tangible things that would be highly 
embarrassing if publicly revealed, whether that’s a sexy note, a 
suggestive article of clothing or raunchy photo.”65
Sex, like nearly everything else, is mediated by technology 
now. People meet partners via Match.com and Facebook; they 
arrange dates by text message; and they send intimate photos 
to one another using smartphones. Couples separated by dis-
tance may use Skype or FaceTime to achieve sexual intimacy—
a practice different only in degree from steamy love letters or 
phone sex. New York Times writer Frank Bruni describes his 
short-distance relationship (Manhattan-Brooklyn) with his 
long-time partner, noting that for them, “alone isn’t alone any-
more . . . there’s Skyping, e-mailing, texting, sexting: a Kama 
Sutra of electronic intercourse.”
 Abstinence 
comes at significant cost: refraining from sharing intimate me-
dia with a partner forfeits benefits from experiencing sexual 
pleasure, feeling greater intimacy, and overcoming barriers 
such as social stigma or geographic distance. “Just say no” is 
bad advice, not merely outdated. 
66 Once consensual use of inti-
mate media makes the opinion page of the New York Times, 
any taboo against or disapprobation of it has jumped the 
shark.67
 
of Revenge Porn, ABC17NEWS.COM (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:29 PM), http://m 
.abc17news.com/news/abc-17-news-special-report-experts-warn-of-revenge 
-porn/-/19167438/19897984/-/jujeee/-/index.html (“Cybercrimes detectives said 
if you don't want a private, nude photos [sic] of yourself getting out, do not 
take one in the first place.”). 
 The consensual use of intimate media creates real ben-
 65. Jill Filipovic, “Revenge Porn” Is About Degrading Women Sexually and 
Professionally, GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2013/jan/28/revenge-porn-degrades-women. Filipovic makes the 
point even more bluntly: “Once you've been face-to-genitals with someone, 
sending them a nude picture doesn't seem like it should be such a big deal.” Id. 
 66. Frank Bruni, Of Love and Fungus, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/bruni-of-love-and-fungus.html. I 
thank Barbara Atwood for this reference, despite her horror at it. 
 67. The idiom “jumped the shark,” popularized by the television show 
Happy Days, refers to a breaking point or an “irreversible decline.” PAUL 
MCFEDRIES, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO WEIRD WORD ORIGINS 86 
(2008); see also, e.g., Fred Fox, Jr., In Defense of ‘Happy Days’ ‘Jump the 
Shark’ Episode, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/ 
sep/03/entertainment/la-et-jump-the-shark-20100903. 
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efits for the partners involved, and is another example of the 
generative powers of ubiquitous networked computing.68
B. INFRINGEMENT’S INJURIES 
 
The unconsented distribution of intimate media seems in-
tuitively problematic. We understand Hollie Toups’s pain im-
mediately. However, there are two additional, less obvious 
risks flowing from unauthorized sharing. The first is straight-
forward: partners considering creating intimate media may 
hesitate, or forgo the activity altogether, if they fear its un-
checked spread beyond their intended audience. This is the 
classic justification for copyright—the threat of uncontrolled 
copying deters potential creators.69 There is a second, more 
complex risk that derives from copyright’s allocation of entitle-
ments. By default, copyright law fetishizes the camera’s shutter 
button for intimate media: the person who presses it is likely to 
be considered the author.70 Only authors can assert rights over 
copyrightable works.71 Yet, this configuration neglects the in-
terests of other people captured in intimate media, who may 
not only be responsible for much of the original expression that 
qualifies a work for copyright, but who also suffer dispropor-
tionately the risks of unauthorized distribution.72
 
 68. Cf. Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1974, 2030–31 (2006) (discussing theory of generativity). 
 Since these 
participants by default lack status as authors under copyright 
law, they have few if any tools to quash unauthorized distribu-
 69. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Anal-
ysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 330–31 (1989). 
 70. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Profes-
sional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1552 (2013) (“U.S. copy-
right law . . . has tended to locate creativity for photographic mediation in the 
choices made by a photographer while deploying and operating her equip-
ment.”); Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Re-
sponse to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 439–48 (2004) 
(reviewing photography cases and finding that, while courts purport to use 
pre-shutter analysis of composition, the photographer is nearly always deemed 
to be author). But see Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Ti-
tanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248, 1999 WL 816163 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (finding the 
director who composed storyboards and shots, not the cameraman, to be au-
thor of underwater footage). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). 
 72. See Michael W. Carroll, Copyright’s Creative Hierarchy in the Perform-
ing Arts, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 797 (2012); Tushnet, supra note 28, at 
1030. 
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tion.73 Even if a participant were deemed a joint author of the 
intimate media, she would be powerless to prevent her co-
author from giving permission for the work’s use, regardless of 
her wishes.74
People featured in intimate media, who are not deemed au-
thors by copyright law, face two forms of harm.
 Romantic partners who understand this legal pe-
culiarity may be deterred from producing intimate media, sur-
rendering a benefit to themselves and, by extension, to society. 
This subsection explores the risks to intimate media’s subjects, 
as a prelude to and justification for an extension of copyright 
law that protects their interests. 
75
1. Negative Utils 
 The first, 
grounded in utilitarian calculus, is a probabilistic analysis of 
the potential injuries, and risk of injuries, that non-consensual 
distribution can generate. The second, based in deontological 
analysis, is the risk of blurring the distinction between the pub-
lic and private selves, and the reduced ability to engage safely 
in intimate activity. 
Having one’s intimate media publicly available presents a 
litany of risks. Some are mundane: employers increasingly uti-
lize Internet resources, such as social networks and search en-
gines, to gather data on candidates.76
 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012) (limiting infringement suits to “the legal or 
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright”); id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i) 
(limiting issuance of notifications of claimed infringement to person author-
ized to act on behalf of owner of exclusive right). 
 Turning up explicit pho-
tos or video should have no effect on an employer’s decision. 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”); id. § 201(a) (providing 
each joint author with equal, undivided interest in entire work); see Thomson 
v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200–02 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing requirements of in-
dependently copyrightable contribution by each claimed joint author and mu-
tual intent to become joint authors). 
 75. Cf. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 
1133 (2011). 
 76. See, e.g., Steve Johnson, Those Party Photos Could Cost You a Job, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/tribu/ct 
-tribu-facebook-job-dangers-20120117,0,1257938.column (noting surveys show 
between 18 and 63% of employers use social media checks, but only 7% of can-
didates realize employers do so); Jacquelyn Smith, How Social Media Can 
Help (Or Hurt) You in Your Job Search, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2013, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/04/16/how-social-media-can 
-help-or-hurt-your-job-search (citing CareerBuilder study finding 37% of em-
ployers use social networks to assess candidates, and that 34% of those em-
ployers had found content causing them not to hire a candidate). 
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This is intimate conduct, not workplace conduct.77 There are 
few if any professions where intimate decisions affect an em-
ployee’s performance or qualifications. Nonetheless, both em-
pirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that this sort of unre-
lated information can adversely affect a candidate’s prospects.78 
A survey of recruiters found 17% ruled out candidates based on 
“excessive personal information” on their social media pro-
files.79 Reppler’s poll of 300 recruiters found that 69% had re-
jected a candidate based on information from their social net-
working profile; 11% of those had rejected someone for 
inappropriate photos.80 A female Yale Law School student tar-
geted by defamatory attacks, including about her intimate life, 
on the AutoAdmit website did not obtain a single summer job 
offer during on-campus recruiting with law firms.81 These firms 
are extraordinarily eager to employ female Yale students with 
strong grades, as she had.82
Similarly, the rise of social networking has provided worri-
some examples. A student teacher was denied a degree in edu-
cation after inadvertently revealing a MySpace photo that 
showed her drinking an alcoholic beverage while wearing a pi-
rate costume.
 And yet not a single one considered 
her worthy of a summer position.  
83
 
 77. One hopes. 
 A Georgia high school teacher was forced to re-
 78. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 76; Leslie Kwoh, Beware: Potential Em-
ployers Are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10000872396390443759504577631410093879278.html; Smith, supra 
note 76; Employers May Misjudge Job Applicants Based on Facebook Pages, 
MYFOXPHILLY.COM (July 8, 2013, 10:59 AM), http://www.myfoxphilly.com/ 
story/22768666/employers-may-misjudge-job-applicants-based-on-facebook 
-pages (quoting North Carolina State University study finding “companies are 
eliminating some conscientious job applicants based on erroneous assumptions 
regarding what social media behavior tells us about the applicants”). 
 79. Kwoh, supra note 78. 
 80. Jorgen Sundberg, How Employers Use Social Media to Screen Appli-
cants, THE UNDERCOVER RECRUITER, http://theundercoverrecruiter.com/info 
graphic-how-recruiters-use-social-media-screen-applicants (last visited Apr. 
20, 2014). 
 81. Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/ 
06/AR2007030602705.html. 
 82. Id.; see Yale Law Sch. Career Dev. Office, Class of 2012 Employment, 
YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/studentlife/cdoprospectivestudents2012 
employstats.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2014); Yale Law Sch. Admissions, Enter-
ing Class Profile, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/profile 
.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 83. Would-Be Teacher Denied Degree over ‘Drunken Pirate’ MySpace Photo 
Sues University, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 29, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
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sign after a parent gained access to her Facebook profile and 
found a photo of her holding a pint of beer and glass of wine 
during a trip to Europe.84 In Florida, a high school English 
teacher was also pressed into quitting her job after her princi-
pal found photos of her modeling swimsuits, under a different 
name, online.85 Finally, Citibank terminated a female employee 
simply because she was judged to be both attractive and given 
to wearing clothes that accentuated her appeal.86
One common response is that these adverse effects work a 
painful but necessary deterrence. On this account, the embar-
rassment, potential discrimination, and other difficulties that 
subjects of intimate media face—while concededly unpleas-
ant—are both a foreseeable consequence of deciding to be fea-
tured in the image, and also a warning to others who might do 
so.
 Employers 
should not use irrelevant information, such as explicit photos, 
in hiring or retention decisions. But firms are risk-averse, and 
qualified candidates are usually abundant. At least a subset of 
companies decides: why risk it? 
87
 
story/2007/04/29/would-be-teacher-denied-degree-over-drunken-pirate 
-myspace-photo-sues. 
 This argument founders in the face of two rebuttals. First, 
this approach forfeits the many benefits of consensual intimate 
media based on the risk that one party will violate the shared 
expectations under which that video or image was produced. 
Intimate media can be used for ends fair and foul. Yet it would 
seem foolish to propose giving up firearms, digital video record-
ers, or encryption code simply because those technologies can 
 84. Teacher Sacked for Posting Picture of Herself Holding Glass of Wine 
and Mug of Beer on Facebook, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 7, 2011, 06:45 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1354515/Teacher-sacked-posting 
-picture-holding-glass-wine-mug-beer-Facebook.html. 
 85. Olivia Sprauer, Teacher, Forced to Resign After Bikini Photos Emerge, 
UPI.COM (May 9, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.upi.com/blog/2013/05/09/Olivia 
-Sprauer-teacher-forced-to-resign-after-bikini-photos-emerge/2531368119876. 
 86. See Meghan Casserly, Debrahlee Lorenzana: Is the Ex-Citibank Em-
ployee Victim or Villain?, FORBES (June 2, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/work-in-progress/2010/06/02/debrahlee-lorenzana-is-the-ex-citibank 
-employee-victim-or-villian. 
 87. Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates into Test of the Internet's 
Power to Shame, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/06/AR2005070601953.html (describing famous 
case of Dog Poop Girl in Korea, whose failure to clean up after her dog was 
captured on video and made her a pariah). But see Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, 
The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 259–60 (2012) (arguing Dog 
Poop Girl “did not deserve to bear the full brunt of the world's contempt for 
litterers”). 
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be used to create harm as well as benefits.88 Rather, we regu-
late to channel uses in socially appropriate directions.89
Second, the rational actor theory of deterrence, where peo-
ple logically calculate risk versus reward, has crumbled under 
the weight of research in cognitive psychology and behavioral 
economics.
 
90 For example, optimism bias causes us to discount 
the likelihood of suffering harm that others do, even when we 
face the same incidence of risk.91 This is particularly true where 
we perceive that harm as stemming from volitional conduct—
where our judgment plays a role in the outcome.92 Even if this 
represents deluded or biased thinking, it is plainly a persistent 
delusion or bias. Sex and wisdom rarely go hand in hand. This 
means the deterrence story is simply that: a story. It does no 
real work in changing behavior. Pretending that it does creates 
real harm to victims with little benefit to potential victims.93
In short, non-consensual distribution of intimate media 
creates tangible, even quantifiable risks and harms for those 
appearing in it. 
 
 
 88. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking 
down Illinois ban on carrying loaded, accessible firearms); Cartoon Network 
LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting secondary 
liability challenge to remote DVR); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 
1132, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 1999) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, 
ban on international distribution of encryption software). 
 89. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (prohibiting felons, certain mentally ill 
persons, and people subject to domestic violence restraining orders, among 
others, from possessing firearms or ammunition shipped in interstate or for-
eign commerce); MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936–41 (2005) (es-
tablishing inducement liability under copyright for actors who distribute dual-
use technologies, but promote unlawful use); 15 C.F.R. § 740.17 (2013) (estab-
lishing recipient-based system for determining whether export registration 
and product classification is required). 
 90. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2010); RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2009); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein 
& Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471 (1998). 
 91. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Per-
ceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 
468–70 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Bi-
ases About Personal Risks, 246 SCI. 1232, 1232 (1989). 
 92. Weinstein, supra note 91, at 1232. 
 93. See Mary Anne Franks, Adventures in Victim Blaming: Revenge Porn 
Edition, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions 
.com/archives/2013/02/adventures-in-victim-blaming-revenge-porn-edition 
.html. 
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2. The Public, the Private, and the Intimate 
In addition to the risks and injuries outlined above, non-
consensual distribution of media capturing intimate activity 
causes harms less tangible, but no less real. These harms arise 
in at least three forms. 
First, tactics such as revenge porn intrude upon a sphere of 
intimate, highly personal conduct.94 Some distribution will en-
croach upon the shared space of a romantic relationship.95 
Maintaining the boundaries of that sphere—boundaries which 
can be crossed only with the assent of each participant—is crit-
ical.96 Intimate relationships are where we explore sensitive, 
even secret aspects of ourselves. A key component of that explo-
ration is control over the decision to whom to expose those 
characteristics.97 Non-consensual distribution deprives us of 
that decision, injuring our autonomy. If we have no recourse 
against trespass, we may be discouraged from fully experienc-
ing intimacy, both sexual and emotional, in all its forms.98
Second, non-consensual distribution works an injury be-
cause of its purpose as well as its method. Revenge porn em-
ploys the darker part of the human emotional spectrum: 
shame, humiliation, fear, and disgust.
  
99 It converts a core hu-
man pleasure into a source of pain. Some images and videos are 
accompanied by commentary making this intent plain: the peo-
ple portrayed in them are described as sluts or whores, as de-
serving of abuse, as dirty or degraded.100 The injury is worsened 
if the attacker is someone with whom the victim shared a pre-
vious relationship of trust: the shift from lover to aggressor—
from Jekyll to Hyde—is part of the harm.101
 
 94. Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intima-
cy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 811 (2010). 
 And, we may have 
 95. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 96. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. 
REV. 311 (2013). 
 97. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 
1121 (2002). 
 98. Anderson, supra note 96, at 321 (“Bodily intimacy is what distin-
guishes a picture of one's face in the newspaper from a picture of one's genitals 
in the same newspaper.”). 
 99. See Filipovic, supra note 65 (stating revenge porn is “about hating 
women, taking enjoyment in seeing them violated, and harming them”). 
 100. See, e.g., Kelly Bourdet, Future Sex: Pornographic Trolling Is the Ul-
timate Trolling, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:22 PM), http://motherboard 
.vice.com/blog/future-sex-pornographic-trolling-is-the-ultimate-trolling; Hill, 
supra note 10; Roy, supra note 4. 
 101. See Roy, supra note 4. 
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concerns about viewers of this material as well. Revenge porn 
caters not to an interest in sex, but to a prurient interest in 
sex.102 We may believe that the desire to see non-consensual 
images of intimate activity is in itself problematic, and should 
be discouraged.103
Third, while rigorous data are not yet available, non-
consensual distribution appears to be a gendered problem.
 
104 It 
seems to target women disproportionately.105 This is likely both 
a cause and an effect of differential societal norms regarding 
sexual activity (at least, sexual activity outside marriage). A 
man who is photographed having sex is a stud, or a playboy. A 
woman who does so is a whore.106 Thus, non-consensual distri-
bution risks worsening tenacious social mores that treat those 
who engage in sex differently based upon gender, and it may 
cause victims to internalize those norms.107
The intrusive, purposive, and gendered aspects of non-
consensual distribution work real harms upon participants, 
even if those harms cannot be quantified. 
 
C. THE FRAGILE PRODUCTION OF INTIMATE MEDIA 
Intimate media are a fascinating, and fragile, example of 
amateur non-commercial production. This mode of producing 
information is shaped by current IP rules, but in ways that 
threaten to curtail output rather than to generate it. Unmodi-
 
 102. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting ALI 
Model Penal Code and defining prurient interest as “a shameful or morbid in-
terest in nudity, sex, or excretion”). 
 103. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 27, at 28, 45–46. This claim is similar to 
that made on behalf of obscenity statutes, which ban material appealing to the 
prurient interest and lacking countervailing value. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1466 
(2012). Legislation based on social mores is controversial: the argument that 
certain consumption preferences are illegitimate has been advanced to oppose 
gay marriage, pornography, and violent video games. See United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729 (2011); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Determining when such ar-
guments are legitimate is beyond the scope of this Article; I simply offer con-
cern about consumers of revenge porn as one species of deontological argu-
ment that could support regulation. 
 104. Filipovic, supra note 65; Franks, supra note 93; Amanda Hess, The 
Real Difference Between Teenage Boys and Girls’ Sexting Habits? Boys For-
ward More, XX FACTOR (Mar. 4, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/xx_factor/2013/03/04/sexting_statistics_teen_boys_and_girls_sext_in_ 
equal_numbers_but_boys_forward.html. 
 105. See Bartow, supra note 27, at 25–34, 44–46. 
 106. Id. at 27–34. 
 107. See Filipovic, supra note 65. 
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fied, then, copyright law is misaligned with the laudable goal of 
encouraging the consensual production and sharing of intimate 
media. This subsection explains why, as context for the reform 
proposal advanced in the next Section. 
As a utilitarian matter, copyright law enables creators to 
recover costs of production.108 Authors face the time and ex-
pense of creating works initially, and must price this sunk cost 
into their per-copy fee (average cost).109 Copyists, by contrast, 
face only the marginal cost of reproducing the work once it is 
released.110 Absent norms-based considerations or legal con-
straint, consumers will do the math and pick the cheaper op-
tion: marginal cost is less than average. The copyists capture 
sales. Potential authors—no fools—can predict this quandary, 
and will forgo production.111 Copyright law is one way out of 
this dilemma: it forces consumers to pay the author, at average 
cost, to bribe the author to produce the work initially.112
This simple economic story falls apart completely for inti-
mate media. People create these videos and images for non-
pecuniary reasons: to express affection and lust, to remain con-
nected to an existing partner, to court a new one. When used 
for their intended purpose, intimate photos and videos are non-
commercial; they are generated between partners, for their mu-
tual use and consumption. (Where the people involved consent 
to sharing the materials with others, intimate media become 
amateur pornography, if non-commercial, or simply pornogra-
phy if commercial.
 
113) The costs of production, and the possibil-
ity of recovering them, are usually both minimal and irrele-
vant.114
 
 108. Landes & Posner, supra note 
 The intended market for these images is quite limited 
and perhaps monopsonistic: a single producer offering wares to 
a single consumer. Demand is highly elastic: substituting a 
69, at 328–29. There are other norma-
tive bases for copyright. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (2011). 
 109. Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 326–29. 
 110. Id. at 328–29. 
 111. Id. at 326. 
 112. Thomas Macaulay called copyright “a tax on readers for the purpose of 
giving a bounty to writers.” Thomas Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House 
of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841). 
 113. See Amanda Hess, Can Cindy Gallop’s Crowdsourced Porn Take Down 
Mainstream Pornography?, XX FACTOR (Aug. 27, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://www 
.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2012/08/27/cindy_gallop_and_crowdsourced_porn_ 
can_real_world_sex_online_take_down_mainstream_porn_.html. 
 114. See Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neuroscience, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L. 
REV. 735, 798–800 (2013). 
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stranger’s photo for that of one’s partner drastically reduces the 
benefit received. Intimate media are perhaps the ultimate be-
spoke good, tailored for a single buyer. Compensation is in kind 
rather than in cash—the return is in other such media, or inti-
macy, or a first date.115
And yet, copyright’s underlying reasoning is precisely cor-
rect: infringement threatens production, and makes creators 
wary of investing in the generation of intimate media, though 
not for pecuniary reasons. Non-consensual exchange can harm 
the producer of the media, its subject, or both. It violates the 
shared set of expectations and norms that govern production in 
this context—and, as Larry Lessig reminds us, norms too are a 
type of law.
 The cost recovery justification for copy-
right protection is orthogonal to the incentives to create and 
distribute intimate media. Copyright’s standard economic cal-
culus simply doesn’t hold here. It uses mechanisms that 
misalign with the mode of production of intimate media. 
116 The holder of the media file (who may be the au-
thor) may gain some benefit, perhaps an illicit one, from the 
unauthorized sharing.117
As this Article discusses below, copyright tries, somewhat 
poorly, to accommodate the creative contributions of those be-
sides the primary author—like the subject of intimate media—
via contract, via joint authorship, or via no recourse at all.
 But, the other party in the transac-
tion—the subject of the media—loses, with little chance at pro-
tecting him or herself. Predicting the risk, that person may de-
cide to forgo production. 
118 
None of these work well for intimate media. Joint authorship’s 
requirements are typically too stringent, and courts are hesi-
tant to recognize such claims after the fact.119
 
 115. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 
 Contractual bar-
104. 
 116. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, at 11, 26 (2006). 
 117. See, e.g., Alex Morris, Hunter Moore: The Most Hated Man on the In-
ternet, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/ 
news/the-most-hated-man-on-the-internet-20121113. 
 118. See infra Part III.A. 
 119. Joint authorship requires intent by all joint authors that they become 
so. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work” as one “prepared by two or 
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into in-
separable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole”); see Shun-ling Chen, 
Collaborative Authorship: From Folklore to the Wikiborg, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 131, 136 (“Courts have consistently chosen to narrowly inter-
pret the joint work clause.”). On courts’ reluctance, see, for example, Richlin v. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 531 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008); Thomson v. Lar-
son, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998); and Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
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gaining works well in professional production settings but is 
unsuited to informal, amateur production.120 People rarely em-
ploy formal contracts in intimate settings, even when the risks 
are clear. Famously, half of all marriages in the United States 
end in divorce.121 And yet, only an estimated 5–10% of couples 
enter into prenuptial agreements.122 People are unduly optimis-
tic about their risk of marital failure.123 Bargaining over a 
breakdown in an intimate relationship is simply too unpleasant 
for many, and partners worry about the signal that asking for a 
pre-nup sends.124 Production of intimate media often takes 
place under circumstances even less amenable to contracting, 
such as between prospective partners, where the request for 
formal legal precautions may radically undercut the prospects 
of completing the transaction.125 Few people want a date pre-
ceded by a license agreement. And finally, an absence of re-
course risks undercutting production. Subjects may be deterred 
from being photographed or filmed if they have no protection 
against unauthorized sharing. Those whose media have been 
distributed without consent certainly are deterred—one woman 
wrote, “I will never, ever, ever send a picture again. . . I don’t 
care if I’m married to you.”126
At present, copyright law will rarely come to the aid of 
someone featured in intimate media distributed without their 
consent.
 
127
 
 120. See generally Benkler, supra note 
 If that person is the subject of the media, but not the 
33, at 439–40. 
 121. Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2009, 58 
NAT’L VITAL STATS. REP. 1, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010) (listing marriage and divorce 
rates of 7.1 and 3.5 per million population for 2008, and 6.8 and 3.4, respec-
tively, for 2009).  
 122. Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 1 
(Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Discussion Paper No. 
436, 2003), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/436 
.pdf. 
 123. Id. at 9–10. 
 124. Id. at 11–12. 
 125. Cf. UM Study: Sexting May Be Normal Dating Behavior for Internet 
Generation, CBS 62 DETROIT (July 24, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal 
.com/2012/07/24/um-study-sexting-may-be-normal-dating-behavior-for 
-internet-generation. 
 126. Elaine Silvestrini, Legislators Intend to Outlaw “Revenge Porn,” 
TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 17, 2013, http://tbo.com/news/politics/legislators-intend-to 
-outlaw-revenge-porn-b82475546z1. 
 127. But see Amanda M. Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge 
Porn, TRI-STATE REGION IP WORKSHOP, Winter 2014, available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2374119 (arguing that since 80% of revenge porn images 
are selfies taken by the subject, copyright can be an effective counterweight). 
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photographer or videographer of it, he or she is unlikely to be 
considered the work’s author.128 Copyright vests in the author; 
non-authors are left to the mercies of other doctrines such as 
contract or quantum meruit.129 Even if the subject is also the 
author, as in the case of “selfie” photos, he or she will have a 
difficult time finding counsel to take the case, at least on a con-
tingency basis.130 Lawyers’ time is expensive, and actual dam-
ages from infringement are quite likely to be minimal—the 
value of a license to a particular piece of amateur porn is gen-
erally miniscule. While statutory damages for infringement are 
available in theory, an author must register the work within 
three months of first publication to obtain them.131 Few people 
are likely to register intimate media, and fewer still to do so 
within the requisite statutory period.132 In short, for copyright 
to assist people featured in intimate media distributed without 
their consent, they must be an author of the work, and either 
be able to pay an attorney’s hourly rate or have registered the 
work within three months of its first appearance on the Inter-
net. Those are unlikely circumstances.133
Given this scenario—where copyright protection is neces-
sary to allow intimate media to flourish, but its current config-
uration does not provide adequate safeguards—reform is need-
 
 
 128. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1143 (2011). 
 129. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(denying movie contributor’s joint authorship claim, but permitting quantum 
meruit claim to proceed). 
 130. See Selfie, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY BUZZWORDS (July 2, 2013), http:// 
www.macmillandictionary.com/us/buzzword/entries/selfie.html (defining 
“selfie” as “a photograph of you taken by yourself, usually for use in social me-
dia”). 
 131. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012). 
 132. It is evidently rare for photographers to register their works at all. 
Christian J. Fisher, Addition Through Subtraction: The Resolution of Copy-
right Registration Uncertainty Through the Repeal of §§ 411(a) and 412, 14 
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 191, 228 (2011); cf. Eva E. Subotnik, Originali-
ty Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 
1487, 1493 (2011) (“The disputes that have fleshed out the requirements for 
photographic copyright have arisen over professional images . . . .”). 
 133. A number of high-profile revenge porn lawsuits are being handled pro 
bono, likely for precisely this reason. See, e.g., Chet Hardin, The Face of  
Revenge Porn, COLORADO SPRINGS INDEP. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www 
.csindy.com/coloradosprings/the-face-of-revenge/Content?oid=2608450; Nathan 
Mattise, Revenge Porn Site Founder Loses $250K Defamation Suit, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/ 
03/revenge-porn-site-founder-loses-250k-defamation-suit. While pro bono ef-
forts are admirable, they will not scale to meet the scope of the problem. 
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ed. This argument rests upon a conclusion for which robust da-
ta remain sparse: the threat of unauthorized sharing of inti-
mate media reduces the output of that expression, compared to 
what output would be under a system of robust copyright pro-
tection, such as proposed in this Article. A chilling effect is in-
tuitively plausible, given lurid media coverage of stories on re-
venge porn, and given revenge porn victims’ vows to never 
again be captured in intimate media.134 As the data from 
Match.com shows, the minority of people who sext are well 
aware of the risks of doing so.135 Their numbers would probably 
grow if those risks dropped. The alternatives—that no one is 
deterred from sharing intimate media due to fears of unauthor-
ized distribution, or that people create these images or photos 
because they are attracted to the risk—are unlikely. We lack 
reliable data on intimate media production and distribution be-
yond crude demographic measures: how often people in various 
age or gender cohorts sext, for example.136
However, as a policy matter, copyright rarely requires cer-
tainty that infringement damages production before acting. For 
example, the effects of Internet-based file-sharing, such as via 
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, on authors’ incentives to produce 
works such as sound recordings and motion pictures are un-
clear, and indeed highly contested. Felix Oberholzer-Gee and 
Koleman Strumpf published a 2010 study suggesting that 
while infringement via P2P networks may account for as much 
as 20% of the decline in music sales, incentives to produce re-
main largely unaffected.
 This is likely because 
sharing of intimate media has only recently been viewed as 
something acceptable rather than taboo.  
137 They note that in the face of wide-
spread on-line infringement, the “publication of new books rose 
by 66% over 2002-7”; and “[s]ince 2000, the annual release of 
new music albums has more than doubled, and worldwide fea-
ture film production is up by more than 30% since 2003.”138
 
 134. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 
 
10; Silvestrini, supra note 126; Alexa 
Tsoulis-Reay, A Brief History of Revenge Porn, N.Y. MAG. (July 21, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/sex/revenge-porn-2013-7. 
 135. See supra note 43. 
 136. See, e.g., Melissa Fleschler Peskin et al., Prevalence and Patterns of 
Sexting Among Ethnic Minority Urban High School Students, 16 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAVIOR & SOC. NETWORKING 454 (2013). 
 137. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, File Sharing and Copy-
right, in 10 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 19 (Josh Lerner & Scott 
Stern eds., 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11764.pdf. 
 138. Id. at 20. 
  
2050 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:2025 
 
Looking simply at sales of media (rather than authorial incen-
tives), the authors find that the aggregate evidence is mixed: 
the majority of studies find file-sharing reduces sales; an im-
portant minority finds no effect; and two studies even find a 
positive correlation between file-sharing and sales.139 Other au-
thors find greater harm from file-sharing. Michael Smith and 
Rahul Telang review empirical studies of infringement’s impact 
and state that the majority conclude it harms sales.140 A study 
by George Baker using Industry Canada data found that a 10% 
increase in P2P downloading reduces CD sales by roughly 
0.4%.141
Yet governments did not hesitate to act in the face of un-
certainty. Copyright protections in the United States, and 
worldwide, have steadily ratcheted up during the file-sharing 
era.
 Does Internet infringement affect the production of 
music recordings and motion pictures? The evidence is unclear. 
142 Indeed, some U.S. legislation and precedent has been ex-
plicitly designed to target on-line infringement. The 1997 No 
Electronic Theft Act increased statutory damages for infringe-
ment and reduced the threshold for criminal copyright liabil-
ity.143 The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in MGM v. Grokster 
recognized a new theory of secondary copyright liability target-
ed at distributed P2P systems such as KaZaa.144 The PRO IP 
Act of 2008 augmented criminal penalties for copyright in-
fringement and set up a new Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Representative (dubbed the “IP czar”145) within the executive 
branch to combat infringement.146
 
 139. Id. at 35. 
 Recently, the administration 
of President Barack Obama began seizing domain names of 
 140. Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Assessing the Academic Literature 
Regarding the Impact of Media Piracy on Sales (unpublished manuscript) 
(Aug. 19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132153. 
 141. See Barry Sookman, The Andersen P2P File Sharing Study on the 
Purchase of Music CDs in Canada, BARRYSOOKMAN.COM (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/08/20/the-andersen-p2p-file-sharing-study 
-on-the-purchase-of-music-cds-in-canada. 
 142. Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, supra note 137, at 20. 
 143. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 
(1997). 
 144. MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 145. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Obama “IP Czar” Wants Felony Charges for 
Illegal Web Streaming, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:07 AM), http:// 
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/03/obama-ip-czar-wants-felony-charges-for 
-illegal-web-streaming. 
 146. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. 110-403, §§ 201, 301, 122 Stat. 4256. 
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websites accused of infringement using ex parte civil forfeiture 
orders.147 The wisdom of these efforts is debatable.148
Lastly, alternative proposals for dealing with the non-
consensual distribution of intimate media would almost cer-
tainly reduce production, an undesirable result.
 What is 
clear is that the U.S. government moved rapidly to augment 
copyright based on intuition, later backed with some data, that 
infringement was harming production of copyrighted works. So, 
too, the negative effects of non-consensual distribution of inti-
mate media need not be proved with perfection before copyright 
moves to deal with them. 
149 This is be-
cause many of these proposals attack production itself, not 
merely unauthorized distribution. Eric Goldman, for example, 
advises “individuals who would prefer not to be a revenge porn 
victim or otherwise have intimate depictions of themselves pub-
licly disclosed, the advice will be simple: don’t take nude photos 
or videos.”150 There is a wealth of similar advice in popular me-
dia.151
 
 147. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 885–
86 (2012). 
 For scholars and commentators alike, the typical answer 
to non-consensual distribution is for people to avoid creating in-
timate media in the first place. Thus, in the absence of a copy-
right-based approach, and even with the adoption of alternative 
 148. See, e.g., id.; Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright In-
fringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 
B.U. L. REV. 731 (2003); Nicolas Suzor & Brian Fitzgerald, The Legitimacy of 
Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright Law, 34 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1 
(2011). 
 149. See, e.g., Nicole A. Poltash, Note, Snapchat and Sexting: A Snapshot of 
Baring Your Bare Essentials, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, ¶¶ 42–44 (2013) (advo-
cating education programs to reduce sexting and restrictions that prevent mi-
nors from using Snapchat). 
 150. Eric Goldman, What Should We Do About Revenge Porn Sites Like 
Texxxan?, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ 
archives/2013/02/what_should_we.htm. 
 151. See, e.g., Sasha Brown-Worsham, 8 Sexting Rules to Avoid Starring 
Naked in Someone’s ‘Revenge Porn,’ STIR (Apr. 6, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://thestir 
.cafemom.com/love_sex/135696/8_sexting_rules_to_avoid; Jessica G., Revenge 
Porn: Hard to Prosecute, Harder on the Psyche, JEZEBEL (Oct. 1, 2008, 1:20 
PM), http://jezebel.com/5057511/revenge-porn-hard-to-prosecute-harder-on-the 
-psyche; Lauren Holliday, Keep Your Pixels in Your Pants; Don’t Sext, CENT. 
FL. FUTURE (June 15, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://www.centralfloridafuture.com/ 
keep-your-pixels-in-your-pants-don-t-sext-1.2600443; Jessica Janner, Revenge 
Porn Ruining Reputations with the Click of a Mouse, KTNV.COM (May 16, 
2013), http://www.ktnv.com/news/local/207747941.html; Gil Kaufman, How 
Can You Avoid Sexting Dangers?, MTV.COM (Feb. 12, 2010, 2:51 PM), http:// 
www.mtv.com/news/articles/1631759/how-can-avoid-sexting-dangers.jhtml. 
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proposals, we will likely forgo the real and significant benefits 
that accrue to partners who consensually employ these materi-
als.152
II.  STATUTORY PROPOSAL   
 
The Article now offers an IP-based proposal to encourage 
the consensual production and distribution of intimate media. 
This Section opens with an explanation of why intellectual 
property law—specifically, copyright law—is the optimal tool 
for this issue. Then, it lays out the specifics of the proposed 
statute, which would add a new section to the Copyright Act.  
A. WHY COPYRIGHT? 
Copyright law holds considerable potential to address the 
promise and problems of intimate media. The task at hand—
encouraging production of consensual media, while constrain-
ing sharing without permission—is precisely that for which in-
tellectual property rules are designed.153 The difficulties of 
checking unauthorized sharing, which inhere in the dramati-
cally reduced costs of creating and distributing information, are 
the difficulties of IP enforcement in the networked digital 
era.154
Copyright has several further benefits. First, IP law is 
principally private law: rights and liabilities are worked out by 
the parties at interest.
  
155 While the government provides the fo-
rum to resolve disputes, it is generally not otherwise a partici-
pant. This removes the resource constraint that public law im-
poses: there are only so many prosecutors, and each can only 
handle a docket of a certain size.156
 
 152. Even Eric Goldman, whose advice is to refrain from producing inti-
mate images or videos, acknowledges the trend: “between sexting and sex 
tapes, far more private pornography is being generated than at any point in 
human history.” Goldman, supra note 
 Prosecutorial constraints 
17. Goldman suggests that, in time, 
norms regarding this material will shift. Id. Changes in law, though, can use-
fully drive changes in norms. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 666, 672–75 (1998). 
 153. Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 330–31. 
 154. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1349 
(2004) (describing copyright owners as “under threat from a flood of cheap, 
easy copies and a dramatic increase in the number of people who can make 
those copies”). 
 155. But see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012). 
 156. See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 516 (2011) (discussing lim-
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limit significantly the scale of enforcement under IP’s public 
law regime. The federal government, for example, brings only a 
relative handful of criminal intellectual property cases each 
year, and half of those result in no jail time for defendants.157 
Private enforcement is more broadly available to victims of in-
fringement than public enforcement. The availability of statu-
tory damages under copyright helps make private litigation 
feasible, despite its costs. While public enforcement has coun-
tervailing benefits, such as the ability to deter judgment-proof 
violators through imprisonment, and the stigma that attaches 
to criminal sanctions, those do not seem worth the cost in abso-
lute enforcement levels.158
Second, IP offers useful mechanisms for addressing tech-
nical problems implicit in regulating intimate media, particu-
larly with a scheme of overlapping rights. Intellectual property 
doctrine is perfectly comfortable with the concept of multiple, 
shared claims in a protected work of information: joint author-
ship in copyright, joint inventorship in patent,
  
159 the independ-
ent invention defense in trade secret,160 and parallel use in dif-
ferent markets in trademark law,161 among others. This 
Article’s solution contemplates a regime with multiple people 
who have claims to aspects of copyright in intimate media. 
Copyright has already achieved working systems of overlapping 
rights in areas such as sound recordings162
 
its on prosecutorial resources). 
 (derivative works of 
 157. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT: ANNUAL REPORT FY2012, at 31 
(Dec. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/dag/iptaskforce/proipact/doj-pro-iprpt2012 
.pdf (listing fewer than 200 IP cases, and fewer than 250 defendants sen-
tenced, per year from 2008–2012). To put this number in context, in 2009, 223 
defendants were sentenced in IP cases, and more than half (126) received no 
prison term. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2009, at 13 (Dec. 2011), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf. 
The same year, 25,874 defendants were convicted on federal drug charges, and 
78.2% received prison sentences. Id. 
 158. See Manta, supra note 156, at 472. 
 159. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012) (defining joint inventions). 
 160. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 
(1990 & Supp. 2005) (defining “[d]iscovery by independent invention” as prop-
er means of obtaining a trade secret). 
 161. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012) (permitting concurrent use registra-
tion); see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EX-
AMINING PROCEDURE § 1207.04 (discussing concurrent use). 
 162. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). See generally Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 
591 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing liability where rap group Beastie Boys licensed 
composition, but not sound recording). 
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their underlying musical compositions), joint authorship,163 and 
the moral rights accorded by the Visual Artists Rights Act 
(VARA).164
Moreover, copyright law has helped ameliorate problems of 
substantiating harm to an acceptable quantum of proof through 
an administrative schedule of copyright damages, intended 
both to ensure rough compensation to injured owners and to 
deter infringers who might otherwise escape liability.
  
165 Here, 
too, the proposed reform employs statutory damages to the 
same end. Harms from unauthorized sharing of intimate media 
are real, but may be difficult to reduce to a specific pecuniary 
figure with sufficient rigor. Finally, American IP rights are 
generally alienable, under various levels of formality: copyright 
entitlements, for example, can be licensed non-exclusively 
based on mere oral agreement, whereas an assignment of the 
same rights requires a written agreement signed by the own-
er.166 The proposal advanced in this Article permits consensual 
distribution when validated by a written agreement.167 This 
comports with the general skepticism towards inalienable 
rights in American copyright doctrine.168
Third, using IP law effectively addresses issues with inti-
mate media within the existing statutory framework for Inter-
net intermediaries. Other approaches, such as privacy-based 
ones, would need to alter the contours of the immunity for in-
 
 
 163. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a) (2012) (defining “joint work” and ownership of 
copyright by joint authors, respectively). 
 164. Id. § 106A. 
 165. Id. § 504(c); see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 439, 446–63 (2009) (discussing relevant damages). 
 166. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012); see Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding oral agreement did not transfer copyright in light of 17 
U.S.C. § 204(a), but holding agreement created non-exclusive license). 
 167. The waiver provision ensures that consensually created pornography, 
whether professional or amateur, can continue unabated. Creators need only 
obtain written consent from participants. Porn producers are already familiar 
with similar contractual and recordkeeping requirements necessitated by the 
participants’ rights of publicity and by federal age verification requirements, 
among other regimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2012); see also Perfect 10 v. CCBill 
LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10 is the publisher of the 
eponymous adult entertainment magazine and the owner of the website, per-
fect10.com. . . . Many of the models in these [pornographic] images have signed 
releases assigning their rights of publicity to Perfect 10.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1519, 1525–26 (2011) (discussing how American authors have greater protec-
tion of their moral rights abroad than in the United States). 
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teractive computer services from third-party liability created by 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.169 Section 230 
immunizes intermediaries, such as search engines and web-
sites, from most tort and state criminal law liability for content 
provided by third parties.170 Some of these proposals would not 
merely alter Section 230, they would eviscerate it.171 This is un-
desirable. Section 230 has been critical to the development of a 
thriving Internet ecosystem based largely on content supplied 
by users.172 Forcing intermediaries to filter their platforms pro-
actively for potentially suspect content would create significant 
costs and inefficiencies.173 Helpfully, however, Section 230 ex-
plicitly exempts intellectual property law from its ambit.174 
Thus, this Article’s reform co-exists easily with Section 230. 
And, Internet intermediaries are familiar with analogous pro-
visions of Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), which condition immunity on compliance with a no-
tice-and-takedown system for material allegedly infringing 
copyright.175 It should be straightforward for Internet firms to 
implement the proposed notice-and-takedown system for non-
consensual distribution of intimate media as well.176
Lastly, IP law is accustomed to First Amendment balanc-
ing. Scholars have rightly complained that doctrines such as 
trademark’s fair use defense and copyright’s durational chang-
 
 
 169. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).  
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 13; Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil 
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 124 (2009). 
 172. Eric Goldman, Unregulating Online Harassment, 57 DENV. U. L.  
REV. ONLINE 59 (2010) [hereinafter Goldman, Unregulating], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558681; Mark A. Lemley, 
Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 
(2007); Eric Goldman, The Implications of Excluding State Crimes from 47 
U.S.C. § 230’s Immunity 4 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 23, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2287622. 
 173. See Lemley supra note 172, at 102–03 (discussing liability of ISPs en-
gaging in filtering). 
 174. Circuit courts of appeal are split on whether the exception, at 47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012), applies to state intellectual property law, or only 
federal law. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding exception applies only to federal IP laws), with Universal 
Commc’n Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 423 n.7 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating ex-
ception applies to state and federal IP law). 
 175. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), (g)(2) (2012). See generally Ardia, supra note 24. 
 176. See Franks, supra note 3, at 657. 
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es are insufficiently attentive to free speech concerns.177 Yet, 
the free speech issue is one to which attention is (and must be) 
paid in IP law.178 Thus, IP offers examples of how to accommo-
date free speech limitations within a doctrinal framework, such 
as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use in copyright 
law,179 and the newsworthiness exception to the right of publici-
ty.180 Other information regulation schemes, such as securities 
laws, tend to ignore First Amendment concerns.181 This Article 
builds on copyright’s scheme by proposing that a defendant be 
immunized from liability where the unconsented distribution of 
the intimate images or video was newsworthy.182
In short, IP law holds under-recognized potential to regu-
late intimate media. The next subsections describe the contours 
of the proposed statutory reform. 
 
B. A NEW COPYRIGHT ENTITLEMENT 
The production and distribution of media capturing inti-
macy is best addressed by adding a new section, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106B, to the Copyright Act.183
 
 177. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
1057 (2001); William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 2267 (2010). 
 The purpose of 106B is to create 
a new form of copyright infringement: distribution or display of 
intimate media, from which a living person captured in it can 
be identified, without the written consent of that person. Put 
 178. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copy-
right after Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082 (2013) [hereinafter Netanel, 
First Amendment Constraints]. 
 179. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012). 
 180. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
 181. These laws may increasingly be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 
See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing misbrand-
ing conviction under Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); see also Jane Bambauer, 
Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2013). 
 182. Such distributions will, one suspects, rarely be newsworthy. One pos-
sible counterexample concerns the dispute between attorney Dwayne Beck 
and a pseudonymous plaintiff. Beck sent a photo of his penis to the plaintiff 
via e-mail, allegedly after propositioning her and rubbing himself against her; 
she responded with a lawsuit. Distribution of the photo (if Beck could be iden-
tified from it) might succeed under a newsworthiness defense. See Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Wins Court Order to Remove Explicit Photo from Court 
File, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
lawyer_wins_court_order_to_remove_explicit_photo_from_court_file. 
 183. The full text of the proposed statute is provided in Appendix A, infra. 
The placement of the right after Section 106A suggests that, like 106A, the 
new right is limited and does not apply to all types of copyrighted works. 
  
2014] EXPOSED 2057 
 
another way, the new provision invests in the identifiable sub-
jects of intimate media the right to approve distribution or dis-
play of that media. Enforcement of the right would vary with 
the type of defendant, who would be divided into natural per-
sons and service providers. While available remedies would be 
identical in both cases, service providers could avail themselves 
of statutory immunity via compliance with a notice-and-
takedown system modeled on the DMCA.184
1. Subject Matter 
 Remedies would in-
clude injunctive relief and, at the plaintiff’s election, either 
statutory or actual damages. Defendants could escape liability 
if the distribution were newsworthy, or if they obtained written 
consent. This subsection next explores the contours of the new 
right. 
The new 106B right would apply to a limited subset of pho-
tographs and audiovisual works.185
First, intimate media contain images of one or more living 
humans. The term “intimate media” would cover accurate, au-
thentic representations of living persons that capture their ac-
tual bodies.  
 This subset would be called 
“intimate media,” a defined term of art that would be added to 
the Copyright Act’s built-in dictionary at 17 U.S.C. § 101. Inti-
mate media would comprise photographs and audiovisual 
works with four additional characteristics.  
Second, the plaintiff is one of the living persons captured in 
the intimate media.  
Third, the plaintiff can reasonably be identified from the 
media, or from the combination of the intimate media and iden-
tifying information presented along with it.186
 
 184. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), (g) (2012). 
 To meet this re-
quirement, the plaintiff would have to prove that a reasonable 
person viewing the media would believe that the plaintiff was 
 185. Audiovisual work is expressly defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). “Pho-
tograph” is not a defined term, but is included within copyright’s subject mat-
ter as a component of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, which are also 
defined in Section 101. See id. 
 186. See, e.g., Meredith Bennett-Smith, Hollie Toups Leads Women in Re-
venge Porn Class Action Lawsuit Against Texxxan.com, GoDaddy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/25/ 
hollie-toups-leads-women-suing-revenge-porn-site-texxxan-go-daddy_n_25460 
66.html (noting that Hollie Toups’s ex-boyfriend posted nude photos of her 
that were accompanied by her real name and Facebook profile); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 
2256(9) (2012) (defining “identifiable minor”). 
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captured in it, and could be identified, such as via display of fa-
cial features, identifying marks (such as distinctive tattoos or 
birthmarks), labels, or accompanying text.  
Fourth, the media captures “intimate information,” which 
would be defined in Section 101 as sexually explicit conduct in-
volving the plaintiff,187 or the plaintiff’s genitals, pubic area,188 
or (if female189) exposed nipple or areola.190
The new right’s coverage would be limited to photographic 
or audiovisual works that capture the plaintiff in a state of 
graphic nudity or sexual conduct, and that permit the plaintiff 
to be identified. 
  
2. Rights Created 
Any person identifiably captured in intimate media, where 
that media meets the subject matter requirements outlined 
above with respect to that person, would enjoy the right to pre-
vent distribution and display of that media. Thus, Section 106B 
would expressly alter sections 106(3) and 106(5) of the Copy-
right Act, which govern the exclusive rights of distribution and 
public display of a copyrighted work.191
 
 187. The proposed statute, see infra Appendix A, would define “sexually 
explicit conduct” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)(i), (ii). 
 Those rights are enjoyed 
initially by the author of a work—typically, in the case of pho-
 188. See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(f)(3) (2012) (defining “graphic” as, inter alia, 
meaning “a viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any 
depicted person”). 
 189. The proposed statute, infra Appendix A, plainly provides female sub-
jects with a greater entitlement than male subjects—that is, their permission 
is required to distribute intimate media that captures their exposed nipples or 
areolas, while such consent is not needed from males. Some state courts have 
held conceptually similar statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v. 
Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875 (1992) (striking down indecent exposure statute that 
applied to display of female, but not male, breasts). While the question is not 
free from doubt, this Article argues that the proposed reform would survive 
constitutional scrutiny in federal courts. See generally Michael M. v. Superior 
Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gender-specific Cali-
fornia statutory rape law against equal protection challenge); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (upholding the same for private insurance via 
employer); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding state’s denial of un-
employment insurance to pregnant women did not discriminate based on gen-
der). 
 190. This requirement would certainly cover the popular Girls Gone Wild 
video series. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. MRA 
Holdings, LLC, No. 5:06CR79/RS (N.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2006), available at http:// 
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/pornlaw/dfrprosmra91206.html. Cultural sacrifices 
must be made.  
 191. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (5) (2012). 
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tographs, the photographer, and in case of audiovisual works, 
either the director or producer (though the right may expand to 
include other joint authors).192 Section 106B would curtail the 
distribution and display rights enjoyed by the copyright owner 
of intimate media: exercise of those rights would be subject to 
the consent of each subject of that media who is identifiable 
and who is captured naked or engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct.193
Moreover, the new 106B would apply to private display as 
well as public. Copyright law distinguishes between public dis-
plays, such as showing a movie in a theater or hanging a paint-
ing in a museum, and private displays, such as watching a 
movie with one’s family or showing a photograph to a friend. 
This proposal expands the 106B right beyond the normal 106(5) 
right, which applies only to public displays.
  
194 Thus, 106B 
would also expressly modify Section 109(c), which permits the 
owners of lawfully made copies to display them publicly.195
The 106B right would be waivable in writing, but not al-
ienable. This part of 106B is analogous to the rights of attribu-
tion and integrity under Section 106A (implementing VARA).
 The 
expansion of control to private display is necessary, given the 
nature of these photos and images, and the potential chilling 
effect of infringement. Showing intimate media to family and 
social acquaintances may work nearly as great a harm as wider 
distribution. Like copyright’s other entitlements, the new 106B 
right attaches to each copy of the intimate media. Thus, a 
plaintiff could enforce her right against anyone possessing such 
a copy, not merely against the copyright owner. 
196
 
 192. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 
 193. There is precedent for limiting distribution rights based on the pro-
duction needs of an industry. The Record Rental Amendment of 1984 removed 
the first sale privilege of renting or leasing phonorecords for purposes of com-
mercial gain, even when the owner has lawfully obtained the phonorecord. 
Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012)). The 
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 performed a similar 
change for computer programs. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134 
(1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012)). 
 194. “Public display” is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 195. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). Such a change is not without precedent. 
17 U.S.C. § 109(d) removes the privilege from holders of copies who do not 
have ownership—those who have acquired it from the copyright owner via 
rental, lease, or loan, for example—unless they obtain authorization from the 
copyright holder.  
 196. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5132 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012)). 
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Like VARA, the 106B right would be held by the subject(s) of 
the intimate media, and not by the copyright owner of the work 
(though, of course, the subjects may also be owners).197 And, 
like VARA’s provisions, the 106B right could be waived by a 
subject if that person expressly agreed, in a signed writing, to 
the waiver.198 Waivers of 106B rights would work differently 
from typical copyright licenses, which can be in oral form if the 
license is non-exclusive.199 Here, oral waivers would be ineffec-
tive. (Oral waivers would present nearly insurmountable prob-
lems of proof for plaintiffs.) Unlike VARA, though, the 106B 
right is exclusive to each subject who meets the requirements 
outlined above; a waiver by one such subject has no effect on 
the rights of others.200
Finally, 106B would include a statutory waiver: a person 
who received intimate media from an identifiable person cap-
tured in it would not be liable, to that person, for viewing that 
media him or herself. For example, if Marge sent a nude photo 
of herself to Homer, Homer would be immune from 106B in-
fringement liability for viewing the photo himself. He could not, 
however, show the photo or give it to Moe without incurring li-
ability. For intimate media featuring multiple subjects, the 
waiver would apply if the recipient received it from any of 
them. This concededly creates some residual risk for the subject 
of such photos and videos—if, in the future, they no longer wish 
the recipient to have the media (as when a romantic relation-
ship ends, for example), they have no power under this new 
provision to compel that outcome. The residual risk seems 
manageable, though. Relationships that end often involve for-
mer partners possessing sensitive material: love letters, roman-
tic gifts, mixtapes, and the like.
 To be operative, the waiver would have 
to reasonably identify the intimate media that it covered, to 
avoid the risk of a blanket license. The waiver also could be 
limited temporally, by medium (for example, still images, but 
not video), or by recipient. 
201
 
 197. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (2012). 
 People are accustomed to this 
 198. See id. § 106A(e)(1).  
 199. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 200. Contrast this approach with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (“[I]n the case of a 
joint work prepared by two or more authors, a waiver of rights under this par-
agraph made by one such author waives such rights for all such authors.”). See 
generally Grauer v. Deutsch, No. 01CIV.8672(LAK), 2002 WL 31288937, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2002) (“Congress plainly meant [in VARA] for any one of 
two or more coauthors to bind the others by waiving attribution rights.”). 
 201. See Filipovic, supra note 65. 
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risk. Lastly, ongoing viewing of the media is limited to the re-
cipient—further display or distribution violates the new 
right.202 The statutory waiver that enables the recipient to view 
the intimate media without obtaining consent creates a small 
residual risk, but avoids the perils of a “right to be forgotten” 
for such content.203
3. Infringement 
 
The new 106B right would be infringed whenever someone 
distributed or displayed the intimate media in which the identi-
fiable subject (the plaintiff) is featured.204 For example, for-
warding a sexted, nude photo without the written consent of 
the person featured in it (where the person could be identified) 
would infringe that person’s 106B right.205 So would displaying 
the original photo to anyone other than the original recipient.206 
Formally, a cause of action for infringement of the 106B right 
would require that the plaintiff establish five elements: (1) the 
content at issue qualifies as intimate media; (2) she was cap-
tured in that intimate media; (3) a reasonable person would be-
lieve she could be identified from it or in combination with ac-
companying information; (4) the media contains intimate 
information of the plaintiff; and (5) the defendant displayed or 
distributed it.207 Distribution would include making the image 
or video available to others, and would not necessitate proving 
that anyone else actually obtained access to it.208
 
 202. Another way to view this immunity is to conceive of 106B as re-
defining “public,” for the purposes of public display, as anyone other than a 
person who directly receives intimate media from the subject. On this account, 
106B would impose liability only for public displays of intimate media, but the 
scope of public display would widen considerably. See infra Appendix A. 
 
 203. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 88 (2012) (criticizing concept); Jane Yakowitz, More Bad Ideas 
from the E.U., FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:57PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kashmirhill/2012/01/25/more-bad-ideas-from-the-e-u (criticizing concept). 
 204. As discussed below, someone who received the work of intimate media 
from a subject of it could view that work him/herself, but could not otherwise 
distribute, display, or perform it. See infra Appendix A. 
 205. See infra Appendix A. 
 206. See infra Appendix A. 
 207. See infra Appendix A; see also supra Part II.B.1 (defining intimate in-
formation). 
 208. See infra Appendix A. Courts are split on whether violation of the Sec-
tion 106(3) distribution right requires actual distribution, or merely making a 
copy available. Compare Nat’l Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 991 
F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993) (infringing distribution right requires actual distribu-
tion), with Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 
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The statute would, however, separate defendants into two 
camps: natural persons, and service providers.209 For natural 
persons, infringing activity would include the usual modes of 
distribution (uploading videos or images to a Web server, e-
mailing them, texting them, etc.) and of display (showing media 
files to others). For service providers, distribution would in-
clude hosting, linking to, or caching intimate media.210
Infringement liability would apply only to intimate media 
created after the effective date of the legislation implementing 
the new 106B right. There are several rationales for limiting 
106B’s temporal application. First, the new copyright entitle-
ment is not necessary to generate production of existing inti-
mate media,
  
211 and there are no (thinly) plausible justifications 
for retroactivity such as restoration or renewed distribution of 
extant works.212 Second, requiring written consent for distribu-
tion of existing media creates potentially significant transac-
tion costs: the person holding the image or video may have ob-
tained verbal consent initially, but must now locate anyone 
identifiable in the media to gain written permission.213 This se-
cond negotiation might be useful in the privacy context, but in 
the copyright arena, it creates deadweight loss.214
 
199 (4th Cir. 1997) (making copyrighted works available for distribution suf-
fices to infringe). See generally Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost 
Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y 1 (2011). 
 The norma-
tive justifications for the proposed reform simply do not support 
retroactive application. 
 209. “Service provider” would be any entity meeting the DMCA definition 
at 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2012). 
 210. Hosting, linking to, and caching media would be defined with refer-
ence to the DMCA: 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (d), and (b), respectively. 
 211. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 257 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing retroactive extension of copyright term because “in respect to 
works already created—the source of many of the harms previously de-
scribed—the statute creates no economic incentive at all”). 
 212. Id. at 207 (upholding extension on grounds, inter alia, “that longer 
terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and pub-
lic distribution of their works”). 
 213. Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 332, 355 (discussing transaction 
cost implications of copyright’s allocation of entitlements). 
 214. Cf. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600, 1613–14 (1982) (discussing solutions, such as compulsory licensing or 
fair use, to transaction cost problems in markets for copyrighted works). 
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4. Remedies 
The remedies available to a successful plaintiff would be 
those for copyright infringement generally, but with a safe har-
bor available to service providers. 
A prevailing plaintiff could obtain both damages and in-
junctive relief. Damages would follow copyright’s established 
system: the plaintiff could elect actual damages, or statutory 
damages at the customary copyright rate of $750–30,000 per 
infringing image or audiovisual work.215 A plaintiff seeking to 
minimize litigation costs could opt for a statutory damages 
award of $750 per work, avoiding the need for a jury to deter-
mine the amount of damages.216 Enhanced damages (up to a 
maximum of $150,000) could be awarded where the plaintiff 
proved willful infringement.217 A finding of willful infringement 
would also generate a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
awarding costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees) to the 
prevailing plaintiff.218 This cost-shifting presumption would en-
hance plaintiffs’ ability to obtain counsel, while cabining the 
award of fees to cases where the infringer knew that their ac-
tions infringed, or recklessly disregarded such a risk.219
 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012). The burden of apportionment on actual 
damages would mirror that under the Copyright Act, where the plaintiff 
proves gross revenues, and the defendant must prove offsetting costs. 17 
U.S.C. § 504(b). The potentially significant amount of statutory damages cre-
ates another rationale for prospective application of § 106B—notice to poten-
tial infringers is vital to the constitutionality of the damages scheme. See Cap-
itol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2012); Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 513 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 Where 
 216. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(finding no right to jury trial when plaintiff sought only minimum amount of 
statutory damages). 
 217. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). See generally Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Tele-
vision, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 342–44 (1998); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. 
Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 218. This would alter 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012), which leaves cost and fee 
awards to the trial court’s discretion. See generally Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 
Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3rd Cir. 1986) (describing factors used in the Third 
Circuit to evaluate award of fees). Under this proposal, a court would be in-
structed to make such an award to all prevailing plaintiffs in cases of willful 
infringement of the new right, unless the court found (supported by specific 
findings) that the interests of justice necessitated otherwise. The Copyright 
Act establishes similar presumptions or mandates for award of enhanced 
damages under certain circumstances. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(3)(A), (d) 
(discussing the presumption and mandate, respectively).  
 219. I thank Dave Marcus for this suggestion, while noting he preferred to 
award costs to all prevailing plaintiffs. 
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the trial court, applying the standard equitable analysis,220 
awarded injunctive relief, it would presumptively include re-
moval of all infringing on-line intimate media under the de-
fendant’s control, and destruction of all such infringing physical 
media under his control.221
A service provider defendant would face the same slate of 
remedies. However, relief would be limited by a statutory im-
munity.
  
222 To qualify for immunity, a service provider would 
have to follow the notice and take-down system established un-
der 106B. The provider would remain immune until it received 
a take-down notification as defined below for the intimate me-
dia in suit. After receiving the take-down notification, the ser-
vice provider could maintain immunity by disabling access to 
the infringing media within five business days of receipt.223 
Taking down the content after notification would protect the 
service provider against a claim for damages by the identifiable 
subject of the intimate media. And, the service provider would 
obtain immunity against suit by the uploader or distributor of 
the images by notifying that person of the take-down, if the 
service provider had information sufficient to complete the noti-
fication.224 Thus, a service provider would lose the benefit of the 
safe harbor if it received a take-down notification and failed to 
disable access to infringing media, or if it failed to notify the 
uploader/distributor, if possible, after receiving a take-down no-
tification.225
 
 220. See generally eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 If the service provider remained within the safe 
 221. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2012) (providing for impoundment and destruc-
tion of infringing works). 
 222. The immunity is a safe harbor, not a defense: the burden of production 
lies upon the plaintiff initially. Cf. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. 
Supp. 2d 110, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing how plaintiff Viacom had the 
burden to show defendant’s knowledge or awareness of specific infringements). 
 223. By default, notification would be directed to the DMCA agent for the 
service provider, although the provider could designate a separate agent for 
this purpose, if the information were made available in the same location as 
the DMCA agent information. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2012); U.S. COPY-
RIGHT OFFICE, Directory of Service Provider Agents for Notification of Claims 
of Infringement, http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/list/a_agents.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2014). 
 224. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) (discussing liability and exceptions). This 
statutory immunity will often be unnecessary, since service providers can pro-
tect themselves via contract. See, e.g., Terms of Service, YOUTUBE § 10 (June 
9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (providing limitations of liability); 
see also id. § 6(F) (“YouTube reserves the right to remove Content without pri-
or notice.”). 
 225. This scheme mirrors that for service providers under 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
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harbor’s immunity, it would not be liable for monetary damag-
es, and would be liable for injunctive relief only on the same 
terms as under the DMCA: compelling it to cease providing ac-
cess to infringing material or activity, to terminate the account 
of an identified infringer, or to take other action to prevent in-
fringement at a particular on-line location.226
Lastly, the legislation implementing 106B would remove 
the three-month deadline for registering copyrighted works (af-
ter first publication) to qualify for statutory damages under 
this new right.
 Similarly, the 
service provider would receive immunity from liability to the 
poster or uploader of the material if that provider notified the 
poster and, on receipt of a counter-notification certifying that 
the work was distributed with consent or was newsworthy, re-
stored access to that work. 
227 Congress implemented this deadline, part of 
the 1976 Copyright Act, as an incentive for authors to register 
their works (since the 1976 Act removed registration as a pre-
requisite for obtaining copyright).228 But timely registration of 
amateur, non-commercial media such as intimate photos and 
videos is highly unlikely. And, removing statutory damages as 
a remedy effectively denies copyright relief to anyone except a 
plaintiff able to afford counsel at an hourly rate. With statutory 
damages, a victim of unauthorized distribution may be able to 
find an attorney willing to press her claim for a share of the re-
covery. By maintaining statutory damages as a viable option, 
the new 106B right makes relief practically as well as theoreti-
cally available to those injured by the infringement of non-
consensual distribution.229
5. Takedown System 
 
The remedy scheme outlined above creates incentives for 
service providers to disable access to allegedly infringing mate-
rial upon receipt of a takedown notification. To transmit a suc-
cessful takedown notification, the plaintiff would submit the 
following information in writing (such as by e-mail) to the ser-
vice provider: 
The plaintiff is a person captured in the intimate media at 
issue; 
 
 226. See id. § 512(j). 
 227. See 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012). 
 228. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2451 
(1976). 
 229. I thank Brent White for this point. 
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The plaintiff could reasonably be expected to be identified 
based on the media, or information accompanying it; 
The media contains intimate information; 
The plaintiff did not consent to distribution of the media at 
issue in writing, or if she did consent, this distribution exceeds 
the express scope of that consent; 
The plaintiff’s name and contact information, including an 
e-mail address; or, if proceeding pseudonymously, the plaintiff’s 
unique identifier and court identification information;  
The URLs or locations under the service provider’s control 
where the infringing media can be located; and  
A statement that the plaintiff signs this takedown notifica-
tion under penalty of perjury. 
The statute would require that service providers redact 
identifying information from takedown notifications before 
sharing them outside the provider’s organization, including 
with websites such as Chilling Effects.230
Submitting identifying information can be risky for some 
plaintiffs, such as victims of revenge porn who face threats of 
violence or stalking.
 In addition, it would 
mandate that providers keep notifications confidential within 
their organizations, including by minimizing the number of 
people with access to them. 
231
Falsified takedown notifications represent a potential prob-
lem with the 106B system. Plaintiffs could conceivably issue 
notifications for intimate media for which they had authorized 
distribution, or perhaps for other media to which they objected 
(for example, anti-pornography activists might target the Girls 
 The statute would provide that a plain-
tiff can seek an ex parte judicial order allowing her to proceed 
pseudonymously, including with an e-mail account created for 
this purpose. The order could be issued for cause, broadly de-
fined, and would include a unique identifier. Upon issuance, 
the plaintiff would include a statement about the order in her 
takedown notification, with the contact information for the 
court and the unique identifier. The clerk of court would be au-
thorized to respond to requests from service providers to verify 
the veracity of the order, but not to provide the plaintiff’s actual 
identifying information. 
 
 230. See infra Appendix A. Chilling Effects, for example, permits but does 
not require submissions to keep identifying information private. See C&D En-
try Form, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/copyright/submit 
.cgi?TriggerID=5 (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 231. See, e.g., Roy, supra note 23 (describing cyberstalking of Holly Jacobs).  
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Gone Wild videos).232 The statute would incorporate measures 
to deter false notifications. It would provide that anyone who 
knowingly submits a 106B notification with material, false in-
formation would be liable to the service provider for either the 
provider’s actual damages, or statutory damages of $750 per 
image or audiovisual work, at the provider’s election. A materi-
al, false submission would also relieve the provider of any obli-
gation to disable access to the allegedly infringing content. Fi-
nally, the person submitting the materially false takedown 
notice would be liable to the person who uploaded or distribut-
ed the media at issue for that person’s actual damages created 
by the notice. The risk of penalties for a falsified takedown 
might deter people from using the system, but the combination 
of scienter requirement, materiality requirement, and need to 
deter strategic behavior suggests that the benefits from this 
precaution outweigh its harms.233
6. Defenses 
 
Two defenses to liability would be available (in addition to 
the immunity for service providers described above). The bur-
den of proof for them would rest upon the defendant. 
First, written consent to distribution or display signed by 
the person appearing in the media would operate as a defense 
for both types of defendants against claims by that person. Lo-
gistically, it might be difficult for service providers to deter-
mine whether such consent had been obtained, since they 
might have no contact with the original distributor of the inti-
mate media, who would presumably have obtained the written 
consent. However, the immunity under the new takedown sys-
tem mitigates this concern.  
Second, to honor the First Amendment’s requirements, the 
statute would provide a complete defense for newsworthy un-
consented distribution or display of intimate media. Defining 
what is “newsworthy” is a non-trivial hurdle; the statute (or, at 
least, the legislative history) could incorporate the common law 
 
 232. Cf. John Timmer, Site Plagiarizes Blog Posts, Then Files DMCA 
Takedown on Originals, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 5, 2013, 5:33 PM), http:// 
arstechnica.com/science/2013/02/site-plagiarizes-blog-posts-then-files-dmca 
-takedown-on-originals (describing falsified DMCA takedown). 
 233. This is particularly so since the equivalent provision under the 
DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012), has been interpreted to be generous to de-
fendants. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 391 F.3d 1000, 1003–
06 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring subjective bad faith on part of defendant to im-
pose § 512(f) liability). 
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precedent developed for the privacy torts.234 The statute should 
also establish that newsworthiness varies with subject matter, 
not subject: the issue must be a matter of public concern, not 
merely that the subject is a public figure. There is no principled 
basis to offer celebrities or politicians less protection against 
revenge porn.235 As a practical matter, it seems that non-
consensual distribution of intimate media will rarely qualify as 
newsworthy, though politicians who engage in sexting are a dif-
ficult edge case.236 For example, former New York representa-
tive Anthony Weiner resigned from Congress when it was re-
vealed that he had sent explicit photos to a half-dozen women 
who were not his wife.237 After two years away from politics, 
Weiner launched a campaign to become mayor of New York 
City,238 framing himself as recovered and repentant.239 Although 
Weiner enjoyed strong support in early polling, that support 
collapsed when gossip site The Dirty revealed a new wave of 
sexts that Weiner had sent over the past year.240
 
 234. This exception is also framed in terms of whether a disclosure is of le-
gitimate concern to the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D 
(1977). See generally Bambauer, supra note 
 At least the 
second set of sexts would seem to qualify for the newsworthi-
87, at 266 (noting the “exemption 
[is] much bemoaned by privacy scholars as the exception that swallows the 
rule”). On the privacy torts, see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstream-
ing Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010) and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007 (2010).  
 235. Celebrities tend to fare poorly with privacy claims in similar circum-
stances. See, e.g., Evan Brown, Court Won’t Ban Gawker from Posting Hulk 
Hogan Sex Tape, INTERNETCASES (Nov. 17, 2012), http://blog.internetcases 
.com/2012/11/17/court-wont-ban-gawker-from-posting-hulk-hogan-sex-tape 
(denying injunction in suit by Hogan over sex tape filmed, and distributed, 
without his consent). 
 236. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, Local New Jersey Politician Resigns Amid 
Sexting Scandal, NPR (Aug. 3, 2011, 8:21 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
thetwo-way/2011/08/03/138948566/local-new-jersey-politician-resigns-amid 
-sexting-scandal; Weiner Resigns From Congress over Sexting Scandal, FOX 
NEWS (June 16, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/16/house 
-dems-may-boot-weiner-from-committee. 
 237. Raymond Hernandez, In Chaotic Scene, Weiner Quits Seat in Scan-
dal’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A1. 
 238. See Domenico Montanaro & Alex Moe, Weiner Defiant as Polls Show 
Him Fading in New York Mayor’s Race, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2013, 9:34 PM), 
http://nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/weiner-defiant-as-polls-show-him-fading 
-in-new-york-mayors-race-v19758464. 
 239. Jonathan Van Meter, The Post-Scandal Playbook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Apr. 14, 2013, at MM24. 
 240. Jennifer Peltz, Anthony Weiner Faces Growing Calls to Drop out of 
NYC Mayoral Bid over New Sexting Scandal, STAR TRIB., July 24, 2013, 
http://startribune.com/politics/216708441.htm. 
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ness exception. Weiner continued extramarital sharing of inti-
mate media after leaving politics for that reason, making public 
vows of redemption, and re-entering politics.241
Fair use would not apply to 106B.
 Thus, the con-
tent of the media is directly relevant not only to a politician’s 
campaign, but to his record and promises specifically addressed 
to sharing of intimate media with people other than his spouse. 
If any intimate media are newsworthy, the latest round of 
Weiner photos would seem to be so. 
242 Fair use relieves an 
accused infringer from liability if their activity is socially bene-
ficial. Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act, a court evaluat-
ing fair use must consider the purpose and character of the use 
of the work, the nature of the work, the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used, and the effects of the use on markets 
for the work.243 The newsworthiness defense covers some of the 
same territory and addresses the First Amendment concerns 
that fair use relieves.244 Fair use is also a poor fit with the copy-
right interests that 106B addresses. In particular, the critical 
fourth factor in fair use—the effect of the use upon markets for 
the copyrighted work—does not align at all. A major goal of 
106B is to prevent unconsented commercialization of intimate 
media.245 Infringement, by unauthorized distribution, develops 
markets—but in a way antithetical to consensual production. 
And, the purpose and character of the use (fair use’s first fac-
tor) is also largely irrelevant; the chilling effects for production 
accrue regardless of purpose. Consider an artist who uses a 
photograph of his naked partner in his artwork—perhaps he is 
mashing up Soviet-era propaganda images with nude photos.246
 
 241. Id. 
 
That display of the intimate photo is highly transformative, 
 242. See infra Part III.B.4. Fair use is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 243. 17 U.S.C. § 107. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569 (1994) (discussing fair use in the context of parody). 
 244. But see Netanel, First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178 (argu-
ing that the fair use doctrine is not currently an effective First Amendment 
safeguard). 
 245. Cf. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95–100 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(rejecting fair use defense for biographer’s use of author’s unpublished letters). 
 246. See David Rosenberg, Soviet-Era Photography Mashups Make Propa-
ganda Illicit, SLATE (July 3, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
behold/2013/07/03/roman_pyatkovka_soviet_photo_re_imagines_propaganda_ 
photography_and_illicit.html. 
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pushing the analysis towards finding the use fair.247
 
 But, this is 
irrelevant to his partner, who may not want the photo dis-
played, regardless of its artsy surroundings. The possibility of 
being involuntarily featured may dissuade her from posing for 
the photo at all. 
*   *   * 
 
The new 17 U.S.C. § 106B would create a right for identifi-
able subjects of intimate media to prevent unauthorized distri-
bution or display of those images or videos, backed by statutory 
damages and injunctive relief, but leavened with immunity for 
service providers following a takedown procedure and for any 
defendant obtaining written consent or making newsworthy 
use of the media.248
III.  THE PUZZLES OF INTIMATE MEDIA   
 
Regulating intimate media via copyright law will bolster 
the production of such works among consenting partners, and 
will reduce unauthorized distribution and performance by 
treating them as infringement. In addition to these practical 
benefits, using copyright to protect intimate media has scholar-
ly advantages as well. Doing so reveals new insights about a 
key pair of copyright puzzles: defining the author of a copy-
righted work, and balancing IP restrictions against First 
Amendment protections for free speech. This Section explores 
both areas. 
A. AUTHORSHIP 
[O]nce an action is recounted False . . this disjunction oc-
curs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters his own death, 
writing begins.249
Who is the author of a copyrighted work, and why? If 
adopted, the statutory proposal discussed above
 
250
 
 247. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“The more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, 
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
 would confer 
 248. See infra Appendix A. 
 249. ROLAND BARTHES, THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR (Richard Howard 
trans., 1967), available at https://wiki.brown.edu/confluence/download/ 
attachments/74858352/BarthesDeathOfTheAuthor.pdf. 
 250. See supra Part II; infra Appendix A. 
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a limited set of entitlements upon people captured in certain 
intimate media. That proposal places this Article squarely in 
the midst of a long-standing, contentious copyright debate 
about the nature of authorship.251
Defining authorship is critical for copyright law. The Copy-
right Act, and the Constitution’s IP Clause, limit the initial 
grant of copyright entitlements to authors.
 It confers upon the subjects 
of intimate media a new right of authorship. Both precedent 
and scholarship have opposed expanding who qualifies as an 
author, for a variety of reasons, and so this proposal is contro-
versial. Perhaps unexpectedly, though, the production and dis-
tribution of intimate media cast new light on these debates, un-
settling previous assumptions and revealing overlooked 
doctrinal support for the proposal. 
252 While an author 
may subsequently alienate these rights, she is copyright’s 
prime mover: rights must vest initially in her.253 Copyright doc-
trine evinces a strong preference for locating a single author for 
a work, sending courts on a determined search for its “master 
mind.”254 A contributor asserting that her creative additions 
merit status as joint author faces a stringent test.255 She must 
prove that her contributions are independently copyrightable, 
that she and other authors intended to merge their expression 
into an indivisible whole, and that all intended to share in the 
status of author.256 Whether due to the Romantic ideal of the 
lone genius,257 to concern over transaction costs,258
 
 251. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 
 or to faith in 
72; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copy-
right: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Mary 
LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving 
the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193 (2001); Tushnet, supra note 28, 
at 1030; Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1323 (1996). 
 252. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C § 201(a) (2012). 
 253. Cf. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, Bk. VIII, at 132 (R.P. Hardie & R.K. Gaye 
trans., 1994) (C. 350 B.C.E.) (“[T]here is a time when there is a first movent 
and a first moved, and another time when there is no such thing but only 
something that is at rest . . . .”). 
 254. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884); see, 
e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000); Tushnet, su-
pra note 28, at 1018. 
 255. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”). 
 256. See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199–202 (2d Cir. 1998). 
But see Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding con-
tribution does not need to be independently copyrightable). 
 257. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual 
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1765–71 (2012) (discussing how authors’ works 
are closely connected to their sense of self). 
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private ordering to solve authorship,259
Legal scholarship has long fought over the proper scope of 
authorship.
 the doctrine is biased 
towards a solo author. 
260 Recent efforts typically begin by noting the con-
tinued primacy of the single author despite shifts towards col-
laborative efforts.261 Some scholars, such as Peter Jaszi262 and 
Michael Carroll,263 advocate for doctrinal or statutory shifts 
that take account of multiple contributors. Others, such as Amy 
Adler, follow postmodern literary theory to deprecate author-
ship altogether, and to encourage the recoding, modification, 
and even destruction of works of art.264 Yet others, such as Rob-
erta Kwall, argue that the authorial voice is undesirably depre-
cated in copyright jurisprudence.265 Finally, Rebecca Tushnet 
defends the current preference for solo authorship on grounds 
that “[m]anageability, at this point in our copyright history, 
may be more beneficial than a regime that claims to protect 
every instance of creativity.”266
Precedent shows courts are chary of awarding rights to 
multiple claimants in a work, but they demonstrate underap-
preciated flexibility in which of those claimants is rewarded 
with the copyright. And, the path to joint authorship, while dif-
ficult, is not insurmountable. While intent remains critical, 
courts seem more generous in finding the requisite intent 
where the claimed joint authors have made roughly equivalent 
contributions to a work—or, at least, to its popular appeal. For 
example, filmmaker Jonathan Morrill shot video of singer Billy 
 
 
 258. See Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1020. 
 259. See id. at 1016–17. 
 260. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Mar-
kets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 
192–200 (2008) (discussing the history of authorship’s role in U.S. copyright 
law); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copy-
right Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 566–613 (2010) (describing historical trends in 
authorship definition). 
 261. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 33, at 380–81, 445–46; Carroll, supra 
note 72, at 804–10; Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1002–03, 1017–18. 
 262. Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collec-
tive Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 314–20 (1991). 
 263. Carroll, supra note 72, at 810–25. 
 264. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 271–99 
(2009). 
 265. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Author-Stories: Narrative’s Implications for 
Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
16–22 (2001). 
 266. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1040. 
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Corgan and his band (at the time), The Marked.267 Corgan took 
a copy of the resulting film, “Video Marked,” and used 45 se-
conds of it in a video for his new (and much better known) 
band, Smashing Pumpkins.268 Morrill’s suit for copyright in-
fringement failed because the district court found that Corgan 
was a joint author.269 Indeed, the genre of the work—a music 
video—was critical to this finding: “music was therefore the 
central component of the completed work . . . without the music 
itself Video Marked would not exist.”270 The film’s audience ap-
peal resulted from both the videography and music.271 Corgan, 
the subject, and Morrill, the videographer, were each instru-
mental to the original, creative expression in “Video Marked,” 
and the court recognized both as authors.272 Similarly, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that professional baseball players could nego-
tiate, under the work for hire doctrine, for joint copyright own-
ership in telecasts of their games.273 And, the same court of 
appeals lowered the threshold for joint authorship, deciding 
that one need not contribute independently copyrightable ex-
pression to qualify.274
Authorship should be understood as an entirely utilitarian 
concept—one that is otherwise normatively empty. Copyright 
posits a creative link between the author and the work’s crea-
tive expression, even if the Romantic notion of the lone artistic 
genius was a trope at the time of its invention.
 Courts still evince a strong preference for 
unitary copyright, but are willing to consider a surprisingly 
broad range of claimants for authorship. 
275
 
 267. Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 
2001); see Tushnet, supra note 
 Yet copyright 
does not hesitate to invest rights in people or entities with only 
28, at 1023–24. 
 268. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. at 1122. 
 269. Id. at 1123–26. 
 270. Id. at 1124. 
 271. Id. at 1125. 
 272. Id. at 1123–26. 
 273. Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 
663, 673 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 274. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Gaiman’s 
contribution may not have been copyrightable by itself, but his contribution 
had expressive content without which Cogliostro wouldn’t have been a charac-
ter at all, but merely a drawing . . . Cogliostro was the joint work of Gaiman 
and McFarlane—their contributions strike us as quite equal—and both are 
entitled to ownership of the copyright.”). 
 275. See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY 48 (2009) (describing the “sadly heroic art-
ist subsisting in a garret” as a “sustaining legend[]” of the publishing world in 
the eighteenth century). 
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an indirect link at best to creativity. For example, ownership of 
foreign works restored to copyright subsists either in the au-
thor, or in the initial rightsholder as determined by the law of 
the work’s source country.276 American law is happy to accede if 
foreign countries confer copyright on non-authors. Or consider 
a more familiar example: the work for hire doctrine.277 Under 
its dictates, employees who create copyrightable works within 
the scope of their employment have no copyright interest in 
them.278 Rather, their employer owns the copyrights from the 
moment of fixation.279 This is not a transfer—it is a reconceptu-
alization of authorhood.280 Similarly, for certain types of special-
ly commissioned works, the person who produces it can agree 
contractually to treat the party ordering the work as the au-
thor.281 Authorship becomes a matter of private convenience. In 
both cases, the statute awards copyright to someone other than 
the person generating the expressive work. It even flips the de-
fault: the employee, or commissioned party, must obtain a 
signed agreement to claim copyright in the first instance.282 
This arrangement makes sense as a practical matter: the work 
would not exist without the financial support of the employer or 
patron, and vesting copyright with them avoids the risk of los-
ing the work to termination decades in the future.283
But: this is a coldly instrumental approach to authorship, 
divorced completely from considerations of whose master mind 
produces the expressive content. Indeed, the copyright owner 
may have no creative input whatsoever, yet still hold rights to 
the work. For example, a New York City management company 
retained three sculptors to produce lobby art for a building in 
Queens.
  
284
 
 276. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b), (h)(6) (2012) (defining “restored work”); see Golan 
v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877–78, 894 (2012) (upholding constitutionality of 
§ 514 of Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which restored these works to copy-
right). 
 The company did not care what they produced, so 
long as it fit inside the building; the sculptors retained “‘full au-
 277. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”). 
 278. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737–38 
(1989). 
 279. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
 280. Reid, 490 U.S. at 737. 
 281. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring that “the parties expressly agree in a writ-
ten instrument signed by them” to so characterize the work). 
 282. Id. § 201(b). 
 283. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 737; see also 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (providing 
termination option for authors). 
 284. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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thority in design, color and style.’”285 Several years later, the 
building’s new owner sought to remove the resulting sculpture, 
and the sculptors launched a lawsuit under VARA to block the 
action.286 They lost, according to the Second Circuit, because the 
sculptors were employees hired to produce art, and thus the 
sculpture was a work for hire.287 The copyright owner supplied 
money, space, and (at the sculptors’ direction) materials; the 
artists supplied the creative work.288
Intimate media highlight, and can leverage, the conceptual 
and doctrinal flexibility of authorship: these photos and videos 
may support claims by a single author, by multiple authors, or 
by no author. The subject of a photo may be its author, as 
where the image is a self-shot.
 And yet they were not au-
thors. From an authorship perspective, the work for hire doc-
trine is easily justified on utilitarian grounds, but it requires 
averting one’s gaze from the severed connection between the 
copyrighted work and its creator. 
289 Both subject and photogra-
pher could be authors, where they deliberately collaborate and 
each contributes copyrightable expression.290 Or, a photo might 
be but a clinical representation of the person and setting, 
where originality is so minimal as to preclude copyright protec-
tion altogether.291 The challenge for a singular approach to au-
thorship is that photography and video have at least two signif-
icant channels for creative input: work in front of the camera 
(lighting, posing, choice of venue, etc.) and work with the cam-
era (shutter speed, angle, flash, etc.).292
 
 285. Id. (quoting agreement between company and sculptors). 
 Amateur, non-
commercial intimate media are often created with limited tools: 
 286. Id. at 81. 
 287. Id. at 85–88. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See generally Pamela Rutledge, #Selfies: Narcissism or Self-
Exploration?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.psychologytoday 
.com/blog/positively-media/201304/selfies-narcissism-or-self-exploration. 
 290. Cf. Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1121–26 
(holding that videographer was a joint author). 
 291. See Subotnik, supra note 132, at 1492–95. 
 292. See Farley, supra note 70, at 427–29, 434. See generally Christopher 
Peterson, Gregory Crewdson’s $1 Million Photo Shoot, JPG MAG. (July 28, 
2007), http://jpgmag.com/stories/1194 (describing one photographer’s extensive 
creative input in photo shoot). There can also be post-capture editing and al-
teration, but these are likely rare with informal, amateur intimate media. See 
generally Gregory Crewdson, Post-Production, APERTURE, http://www.aperture 
.org/crewdson (last visited Apr. 20, 2014) (describing post-capture process of 
editing). 
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smartphones, and simple digital cameras. These have compara-
tively few settings and adjustments—they are the sort of devic-
es for which the term “point-and-shoot” was invented. Thus, the 
creativity involved in working with the camera may also be lim-
ited; put another way, the contribution of the photographer or 
videographer may be small, either due to technological con-
straints or simply minimal effort. Similarly, the contribution of 
the subject can vary. A snapshot may involve little original ex-
pression, or the subject may select their costume (or lack of it), 
pose, and so forth. Choices of venue and lighting may well be 
joint decisions. It is difficult if not impossible to craft a clean 
rule for the authorship of intimate media. Often, both the sub-
ject and the person holding the camera will have plausible 
claims.  
Joint authorship is no help. It requires shared intent—
intent to merge creative contributions, and intent to share au-
thorship. The difficulty is that here, intent is a fiction: it is 
most likely that the participants do not have any relevant in-
tent. Private ordering through contract is another solution that 
is plausible in theory but infeasible in practice.293 Here, too, au-
thorship needs to be instrumental. It is capable of being flexi-
ble: in places, it adapts to solve difficulties created by each in-
dustry’s individual structure of production.294 Authorship is not 
a holy icon—it is a chess piece.295
Implementing this Article’s proposal will bolster output of 
intimate media, but perhaps at the cost of fragmentation: oth-
ers will advocate for special provisions to address their particu-
lar concerns, leading to an increasingly particularized and in-
  
 
 293. See supra Part I.C. 
 294. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1021 (“Authorship moves around as needed 
to meet the needs of the industry.”). 
 295. In some cases, it may even be a ping pong ball. Sound recordings were 
not listed among the works eligible for special treatment as a work for hire 
under the second prong of the definition. See Mary LaFrance, Authorship and 
Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 375 (2002). 
Then, in 1999, at the recording industry’s behest, a Senate staffer inserted a 
provision into an unrelated satellite bill that added sound recordings. Id. Mu-
sicians erupted in protest. Id. at 375–76. A year later, Congress reversed the 
change and swept the whole thing under the rug by statute. 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012) (“Paragraph (2) [of work for hire definition] shall be interpreted as if 
both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made For Hire and Copyright Corrections Act 
of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications 
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 
106–113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness 
by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.”); LaFrance, su-
pra, at 375–76. 
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coherent copyright system.296 But copyright is nothing if not a 
congeries of industry-specific tweaks. Copyrights in sound re-
cordings do not include a right of public performance—except 
via digital audio transmission.297 Architectural works under 
copyright have no protection against photographs or pictures 
that reproduce a building instantiating the work, so long as 
that building is publicly visible.298 The first sale doctrine lets 
lawful purchasers rent movie DVDs, but not software DVDs.299 
A small cafe may show television programming on a set behind 
the bar, but a giant restaurant in Times Square may not—
unless it complies with restrictions on the size and number of 
televisions and speakers.300
Special pleading can have value. There are pragmatic con-
siderations for treating DVDs of motion pictures and software 
code differently: the risk of widespread infringement is greater 
with the latter than the former.
 Copyright is unprincipled: it is all 
about special pleading. Distortion of an elegant copyright sys-
tem is not a risk—because it is already distorted.  
301 The absence of a public per-
formance right for sound recording copyrights originated in his-
torical accident, but has come to make economic sense, as the 
payola scandals demonstrate.302 The public performance right 
exceptions for restaurants and bars were found to violate World 
Trade Organization rules—yet America was content to pay a 
small penalty each year to protect small businesses.303
 
 296. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO STATE L.J. 1361, 1388–1400 
(2009) (setting out theoretical framework supporting uniform IP rights across 
industries as default position); William Fisher III, The Disaggregation of Intel-
lectual Property, HARVARD L. BULL. (2004), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/ 
bulletin/2004/summer/feature_2-1.php (discussing and analyzing how IP law 
has varied by industry). 
  
 297. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012). 
 298. Id. § 120(a). 
 299. See id. § 109(b)(1)(A). 
 300. Id. § 110(5)(B)(ii). 
 301. John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are 
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 15 n.45, 72 (2004). 
 302. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1908); 
see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissem-
ination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622–23 (2001). On payola, see Krystal 
Conway, Comment, The Long Road to Desuetude for Payola Laws: Recognizing 
the Inevitable Commodification of Tastemaking, 16 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 343, 347–54 (2006). 
 303. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, 
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ 
e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm; see also Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/ 
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Multiple authorship under the new 106B right may in-
crease transaction costs by potentially requiring authorization 
from more than one party, but copyright law is no stranger to 
provisions that ineluctably increase transaction costs. The ter-
mination provisions by which an author can reclaim copyright, 
free from prior licenses or assignments, require multiple nego-
tiations if one wishes to exploit a work for its entire term.304 
VARA mandates a separate contract for waiver of its moral 
rights provisions.305 For U.S. works,306 a plaintiff alleging in-
fringement must register her work with the Library of Con-
gress before bringing suit.307 She must be sure to register with-
in three months of first publication if she wishes to recover 
statutory damages from infringers.308 All of these well-
established copyright provisions increase transaction costs, but 
that is not the measure of their worth. The key, as with the 
new 106B right, is whether those costs are outweighed by their 
benefits.309
Copyright’s search for a single author often resembles Di-
ogenes’s search of Athens for an honest man: fruitless and 
faintly cynical.
 For intimate media, the generative benefits of 106B 
should eclipse its costs. If the concern is that this Article’s ap-
proach to authorship for intimate media will lead to a future 
filled with industry-specific, atomized copyright law—that fu-
ture is already here, and is not necessarily undesirable. 
310
 
dispute-settlement-proceedings/united-states-%E2%80%94-section-1105-us 
-copyright-ac (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 Enabling copyright law to recognize multiple 
authors for intimate media improves the accuracy and 
generativity of the doctrine. 
 304. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012) (enabling author to terminate transfer or 
license during five-year period beginning thirty-five years from date of execu-
tion or publication); see Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557 BTM (RBB), 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63858, at *4–13 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (discussing 
need for music label to negotiate with each joint author who had transferred 
copyright interest separately). 
 305. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012). 
 306. Id. § 101 (defining “United States work”). 
 307. Id. § 411(a). 
 308. Id. § 412(2). 
 309. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legaliz-
ing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 359–61 (2008) (critiquing transaction 
cost tradeoff for derivative works right); Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 
331–32 (discussing transaction costs of copyright law overall). 
 310. See Leon R. Kass, Looking for an Honest Man, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Fall 
2009, at 160, 162.  
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B. FIRST AMENDMENT 
Copyright law both censors and promotes speech.311 This 
brings the doctrine inevitably into conflict with the First 
Amendment’s protection for free expression. Intimate media, 
and this Article’s proposal for them, point up unresolved ten-
sions in doctrinal and scholarly treatment of the copyright/First 
Amendment intersection. Recent Supreme Court precedent is 
highly permissive towards Congressional regulation of copy-
rightable works, engaging only in rational review unless the 
statute touches upon the “traditional contours” of copyright 
law.312
Copyright itself can be seen as a form of content-based re-
striction: it targets specified types of speech, and prohibits (via 
injunctive relief,
 Scholars have responded with a mix of criticism towards 
the Court’s approach and confidence that the First Amendment 
still has a meaningful role in checking copyright. This subsec-
tion uses intimate media to explore the uncertain terrain of the 
First Amendment and copyright’s “traditional contours.” 
313 potentially harsh statutory damages,314 and 
even criminal penalties,315) copying, distributing, adapting, or 
publicly performing or displaying that speech.316 Read the Fed-
eralist Papers aloud on Boston Common and you are a patriot; 
read Richard Brookhiser’s biography of James Madison aloud 
in the same place and you are an infringer.317
 
 311. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); David S. Ol-
son, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 1393, 1398–99 (2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use 
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 
538–45 (2004). 
 And yet, so long 
as Congress respects the (minimal) constitutional bounds on its 
legislative powers under the IP Clause, judicial review of its 
policies is extraordinarily deferential given the speech interests 
 312. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (stating when “Congress 
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary”). 
 313. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
 314. Id. § 504(c). 
 315. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012). 
 316. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“[S]ome restriction on expression is the 
inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright . . . .”). There is a rich 
scholarly literature on this topic. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the 
First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 
DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the 
First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, Locat-
ing Copyright]. 
 317. See RICHARD BROOKHISER, JAMES MADISON (2013). 
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at stake.318 So long as Congress leaves the idea-expression di-
chotomy and fair use untouched,319 other statutory provisions 
draw mere rational review.320 The courts defer to legislative 
judgment as to what set of rights best encourages the creation 
and dissemination of copyright-eligible information, even if the 
statutory connection to incentives is quite attenuated. Thus, 
Congress can lawfully keep copyrighted works from moving in-
to the public domain for an additional twenty years,321 and can 
retract works from the public domain to place them under cop-
yright protection.322 The former might, the Court has held, en-
courage dissemination of existing works323 (for it could not en-
courage production of extant expression).324 The latter might, 
via compliance with international obligations, improve protec-
tion of American works abroad, thereby augmenting incentives 
to produce them.325 Similarly, Congress could strengthen the 
distribution right for software and sound recordings beyond the 
protections available for other works.326 When it thinks it nec-
essary, Congress can even create new rights, such as VARA’s 
moral rights,327 or the DMCA’s right of access for works safe-
guarded by technological protection measures.328
 
 318. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 185, 221 (2003); Netanel, First 
Amendment Constraints, supra note 
 In short, Con-
178, at 1101; Netanel, Locating Copy-
right, supra note 316, at 3 (“[C]ourts have almost never imposed First 
Amendment limitations on copyright.”). 
 319. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91. 
 320. Id. at 889 (holding challenged statute “falls comfortably within Con-
gress’s authority under the Copyright Clause” because “Congress rationally 
could have concluded that adherence to Berne ‘promotes the diffusion of 
knowledge’”). 
 321. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186. 
 322. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884–87. 
 323. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206–07. 
 324. Id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 325. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
 326. See supra note 193. 
 327. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012). 
 328. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A). While § 1201(c)(1) states that the DMCA does not 
affect the scope of copyright entitlements or fair use, the circuit courts of ap-
peal have split on whether a fair use defense is available against a 
§ 1201(a)(1)(A) claim. See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928, 
952 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Congress created a distinct anti-circumvention right un-
der § 1201(a) without an infringement nexus requirement.”); Universal City 
Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001). But see Chamberlain 
Grp. v. Skylink Techs., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a nexus 
between circumvention and infringement). Either fair use is a defense to cir-
cumvention, or the DMCA creates a new right under copyright. See Netanel, 
First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178, at 1113–20. Neil Netanel ar-
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gressional power to shape copyright is nearly unchecked.329
And yet, this Article’s proposal highlights tensions with the 
First Amendment by pressing against the uncertain boundaries 
of one of copyright’s “traditional contours”: fair use.
 
Should the legislature decide that intimate media require the 
addition of the proposed 106B right, the courts are unlikely to 
second-guess that judgment. 
330 Scholars 
disagree strongly on how sufficient the traditional contours are 
to accommodate First Amendment interests. Neil Netanel ar-
gues that they track Melville Nimmer’s influential “definitional 
balancing” approach, under which courts weigh non-speech in-
terests against speech burdens, and promulgate categories of 
speech that are protected along with those that may be regu-
lated.331 For Netanel, the traditional contours create significant, 
underappreciated limits on Congressional power to regulate 
speech.332 In contrast, David Olson argues that the legislation 
upheld in Golan is not only invalid under the First Amend-
ment, since it fails to encourage the creation or dissemination 
of new knowledge, but does not even satisfy the IP Clause’s in-
ternal requirement that legislation promote the progress of sci-
ence.333 Mark Bartholomew and John Tehranian contend that 
the challenges of separating idea from expression make that 
distinction an inadequate protection for free speech.334 And fair 
use, they argue, has been applied to expand copyright, not to 
constrain it.335 And finally, for Jennifer Rothman, the First 
Amendment has simply failed as a check on copyright law; 
scholars and advocates should explore other limiting principles, 
such as substantive due process and liberty interests.336
 
gues that fair use must, on First Amendment grounds, operate as a defense. 
Id. 
 
 329. Netanel, First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178, at 1084–86. 
 330. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91. 
 331. Netanel, First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178, at 1084–87 
(citing Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970)). 
332. Id. at 1128.  
 333. David S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Progress of Sci-
ence: Constitutional Constraints on Copyright Laws, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 185, 194–98 (2011). 
 334. Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intel-
lectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2013). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free 
Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 493–503 (2010). 
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This Article’s proposal tests these competing perspectives. 
It explores whether the traditional contours—in particular, fair 
use—are to be evaluated substantively or formalistically. The 
new 106B right is not subject to fair use.337 However, it does 
have a newsworthiness provision that provides robust free 
speech protection, modeled on similar provisions in other IP 
doctrines.338
While the newsworthiness defense is not co-extensive with 
fair use, it is also not necessarily inferior to it. A parodic, non-
consensual use of a naked photograph of an identifiable person 
would not be likely to be considered newsworthy, particularly 
where there was no issue of public concern related to the pho-
to.
 Formalistically, then, 106B should face heightened 
scrutiny since it transgresses the prohibition on removing fair 
use protections. This Article argues, though, that the newswor-
thiness exception to the 106B rights should suffice substantive-
ly to accommodate First Amendment interests. If it does not, 
then either formalism has overtaken free speech analysis in 
copyright, or similar protections in other doctrines such as the 
privacy torts and right of publicity are suspect as well. 
339 Parody, by contrast, is a paradigmatic fair use.340 The un-
authorized use of a photograph of two recognizable people in an 
advertising campaign against same-sex marriage would likely 
constitute copyright infringement, not fair use;341 however, the 
advertiser would probably escape liability under newsworthi-
ness since the use would not count as commercial.342
 
 337. See infra Appendix A. 
 The news-
worthiness exception in 106B cannot be dismissed as an inade-
quate subset of fair use. Rather, it seeks to protect free 
expression via a different mechanism. 
 338. See infra Appendix A. 
 339. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 340. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, 137 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 341. Cf. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 71–72 (2d Cir. 
1997) (reversing the district court’s determination that a fair use defense was 
warranted in a copyright suit involving use of an artistic poster on a television 
set); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that no reason-
able jury could find permissive fair use because the copied work included “the 
essence of the photograph”). 
 342. See Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 
(D.D.C. 2006) (finding no liability since, under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 652C, there is no violation “when a person’s picture is used to illustrate a 
noncommercial, newsworthy article” (quoting Martinez v. Democrat-Herald 
Publ’g Co., 669 P.2d 818, 820 (Or. Ct. App. 1983))). 
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Newsworthiness has been held adequate to the task of 
safeguarding the First Amendment in other intellectual proper-
ty doctrines, and in tort law. This suggests that, even under 
heightened scrutiny, the new 106B right should survive sub-
stantive analysis. Consider the human cannonball. In Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court per-
mitted a performer’s claim of infringement of his right of pub-
licity when a local television station filmed his entire fifteen-
second performance, during which he was shot out of a cannon 
into a distant net.343 The station relied upon First Amendment 
privilege to defeat Zacchini’s claim.344 Zacchini’s performance 
was not fixed with his authorization (he expressly instructed 
the television reporter not to record), and thus he could not as-
sert a federal copyright claim.345 While the Court repeatedly 
drew analogies to copyright doctrine,346 it analyzed the scope of 
the news reporting exception to Zacchini’s state law right of 
publicity claim.347 The majority opinion recognized the need for 
First Amendment accommodation via the exception, but none-
theless found that the broadcast exceeded it.348 Doctrinally, 
though, newsworthiness sufficed to protect free speech inter-
ests. The Court has ruled similarly in other IP contexts, such as 
anti-sound recording piracy laws349 and trade secret laws.350
 
 343. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–66 (1977) 
(5-4 decision). While the Supreme Court of Ohio treated Zacchini’s claim as 
one sounding in tort, it explained that the core of the injury was to his “per-
sonal control over commercial display and exploitation of his personality and 
the exercise of his talents.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 
454, 459 (Ohio 1976), rev’d, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The right of publicity is thus 
conceptually similar to intellectual property, and indeed Ohio’s statutory ver-
sion of the right treats it as such. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2741.01–.99 (Lex-
isNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012). 
 
 344. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565. 
 345. Id. at 563–64; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (requiring copyrightable 
subject matter to be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression”). 
 346. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575–77. 
 347. Id. at 569 (“The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent is constitu-
tionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that 
would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity.”). 
 348. Id. at 578–79. 
 349. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (5-4 decision). Appel-
late courts have upheld the federal anti-bootlegging statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2319A, which prohibits unauthorized recording of live musical performances, 
without reaching First Amendment considerations. See, e.g., United States v. 
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding to the district court to 
consider the First Amendment argument); United States v. Moghadam, 175 
F.3d 1269, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the statute under the Copy-
right Clause and the Commerce Clause). 
  
2084 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:2025 
 
There is analogous precedent on the topic of intimate me-
dia and newsworthiness. Nancy Benoit was a model and pro-
fessional wrestler who was murdered by her husband, Chris 
Benoit.351 Early in her career, Benoit had posed for nude photos, 
which she believed had been destroyed at her request.352 They 
were not. After her death, Hustler magazine published the pho-
tos, along with a minimal story about Benoit’s career and the 
murder case.353 Her family sued based on infringement of Be-
noit’s right of publicity under Georgia law.354 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that Georgia had adopted the newsworthiness excep-
tion to protect freedom of speech.355 The court analyzed the 
interaction between the article (clearly newsworthy) and the 
photographs (clearly not), to see if the aggregate merited pro-
tection.356 It did not—the court held that “the article was inci-
dental to the photographs,” and hence could not immunize 
them.357 Courts have similarly treated the newsworthiness ex-
ception as a sufficient First Amendment safeguard in other tort 
contexts, such as with invasion of privacy via public disclosure 
of private facts.358
While 106B departs from copyright’s traditional contours 
by omitting fair use as a defense, it ought to survive substan-
tive First Amendment scrutiny. If it does not, copyright is left 
with an uncomfortable dilemma: either the line of cases finding 
newsworthiness to be adequate free speech protection in other 
contexts is misguided, or fair use must be analyzed formalisti-
cally. In any event, review of 106B’s newsworthiness exception 
is likely to elucidate the values and parameters at play when 
  
 
 350. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478–79 (1974). 
 351. See Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Philip Caulfield, Family of Nancy Benoit, Killed by Wrestler Husband Chris 
Benoit, Battles Hustler in Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/family-nancy-benoit-killed 
-wrestler-husband-chris-benoit-battles-hustler-court-article-1.1012181. 
 352. Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1204. 
 353. Id. at 1209–10. 
 354. Id. at 1204.  
 355. Id. at 1208. 
 356. Id. at 1209–10. 
 357. Id. at 1209. The court used the phrase “legitimate public concern,” id. 
at 1208 (quoting Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 
1998)), to distinguish newsworthy information from that which merely in-
volved “morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.” Id. 
at 1211 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. h (1977) (de-
fining tort of unlawful publication of private facts)). 
 358. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975); Sipple v. 
Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
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courts assess the interplay between the First Amendment and 
copyright. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES   
There are at least two alternatives to this Article’s IP-
based approach to the issues surrounding intimate media, each 
drawing upon a different doctrinal heritage. The first is crimi-
nal law; the second is privacy law. This Section briefly analyzes 
each, and suggests reasons why this Article’s proposal is pref-
erable.  
A. CRIMINAL LAW 
Some scholars would prefer to deploy federal criminal law 
to deal with non-consensual distribution of intimate media.359 
For example, Mary Anne Franks, Danielle Citron, and Jacquel-
ine Lipton look to federal cyberstalking, sexual harassment, 
and hate crime legislation as models.360 Citron and Franks ad-
vocate new federal legislation that specifically criminalizes re-
venge porn.361 These scholars point to a number of benefits of 
this approach. From a utilitarian perspective, criminal law 
could achieve greater deterrence.362 The threat of prison will de-
ter the risk-averse and the judgment-proof.363 The state’s inves-
tigative powers dwarf those of a private litigant, making detec-
tion and enforcement more certain.364
 
 359. Section 230 preempts state criminal law, so a federal statute would be 
needed. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), (e)(3) (2012). New Jersey’s statute is often cited 
as a model for federal law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9(b)–(c) (2013); see, e.g., 
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 20–22, 25–27), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368946 (discussing New Jersey’s revenge 
porn statute and proposing a federal criminal statute addressing the problem). 
 The stigma that attaches 
to criminal sanctions serves important expressive values about 
how society views the conduct of those who distribute intimate 
 360. Citron, supra note 171, at 89–95; Franks, supra note 3, at 657–71; 
Lipton, supra note 128, at 1118–22. 
 361. Citron & Franks, supra note 359 (manuscript at 25–27). The authors 
also propose a model state statute to address the problem. Id.  
 362. See Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law Re-
sponse to Revenge Porn, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013), http:// 
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need-a-federal 
-criminal-law-response-to-revenge-porn.html; Lipton, supra note 128, at 1117–
18. 
 363. Cf. Lipton, supra note 128, at 1117, 1131 (emphasizing the benefits of 
criminal over civil law in this context). 
 364. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 598–
600 (2012). 
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media without subjects’ permission.365 Finally, and most in-
strumentally, federal criminal law is exempt from Section 230’s 
safe harbor, meaning that pressure can be brought to bear on 
Internet intermediaries.366
Federal criminal law may help, but there are reasons to be 
skeptical, and in particular to prefer an IP-based approach. 
First, deterrence may be greater under a system of private en-
forcement than public enforcement. While risk-neutral infring-
ers would rationally calculate their expected penalties, in prac-
tice people tend to respond more to levels of enforcement (the 
chance of being caught) rather than the level of sanctions or 
expected penalty.
 
367 Enforcement levels—and hence deter-
rence—are likely to be greater under a private law regime than 
a public law one.368 Federal prosecutors face resource con-
straints—pressures from national security, narcotics, organized 
crime, and white collar crime investigations are likely to 
swamp efforts to prosecute revenge porn. Consider again en-
forcement of criminal statutes for intellectual property: despite 
well-funded, motivated interest groups supporting more prose-
cutions, and despite passage of a statute with specific resources 
devoted to IP enforcement, such cases are still unusual for a 
U.S. ’Attorney’s docket.369
 
 365. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594–601 (1996) (discussing the expressive role of crim-
inal punishment). 
 While private litigants face limits on 
 366. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2012). 
 367. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: 
How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 207–08 (2012) 
(explaining the relationship between various insurance options and drivers’ 
choices); Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, More Tickets, Fewer 
Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads, 54 J.L. & ECON. 
863, 883–84 (2011) (proposing a relationship between traffic fines, safe driv-
ing, and automobile accidents); Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & 
Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copy-
right Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 661–64 (2006) (“Many studies find 
very little or no deterrent effect at all from increasing the level of enforcement 
or penalties.”). 
 368. Private enforcement is common, and successful, in other areas, such 
as under the False Claims Act. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the 
Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1244, 1244 (2012). 
 369. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 157, at 31. Congress passed the 
PRO IP Act in 2008, Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual 
Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4256 (2008), when 
the Department of Justice charged 259 defendants in 197 cases. U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 157, at 31. Only once in the next four years (2010) did the 
Department charge as many defendants (259, again), and never again did it 
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their financial resources and willingness to pursue litigation, 
the availability of statutory damages under this Article’s pro-
posal mitigates the former, and it is not clear why victims’ will-
ingness to pursue relief would be less under a copyright system 
than a criminal one. 
Moreover, at present the limit on criminal efforts against 
non-consensual distribution appears to be law enforcement in-
terest rather than inadequate tools. Danielle Citron documents 
extensively the resistance from police and prosecutors to tackle 
infringement such as revenge porn, even when there are stat-
utes that clearly criminalize the conduct at issue.370 Norms pre-
dominate: prosecutors are, at present, generally unwilling to 
pursue cases of non-consensual distribution.371 Indeed, the re-
venge porn prosecution of Holly Jacobs’s stalker has drawn 
media attention precisely because it is so unusual.372 Enacting a 
new statute will not shift prosecutorial behavior. And if an on-
line civil rights effort changes how U.S. Attorneys approach 
unauthorized distribution of intimate media, new laws may be 
superfluous.373
The stigma of criminal sanctions has drawbacks as well as 
benefits. A criminal statute would impose sanctions upon use 
and distribution of truthful information. The courts have tradi-
tionally scrutinized such laws with particular care.
 It seems preferable to rely on distributed private 
enforcement rather than scarce, and perhaps unwilling, federal 
prosecutors. 
374
 
bring as many cases. Id. As for results: in 2008, 242 defendants were sen-
tenced. In the next four years, that number steadily fell (except for a one de-
fendant increase from 2010 to 2011), reaching 202 defendants in 2012. Id. 
These numbers comprise a small fraction of the Department’s caseload; in fis-
cal year 2012, the Department charged a total of 63,118 criminal cases against 
85,621 defendants. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ANNU-
AL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 6 (2012), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2012/12statrpt.pdf. 
 And, the 
 370. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 85–93) (on file with author). 
 371. See, e.g., Tracy Clark-Flory, Criminalizing “Revenge Porn,” SA-
LON.COM (Apr. 6, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/07/criminal 
izing_revenge_porn; Roy, supra note 23. See generally CITRON, supra note 370, 
at 85 (“Prosecutors undercharge or, worse, refuse to charge perpetrators.”). 
 372. See Roy, supra note 23 (describing prosecution of Jacobs’s ex-boyfriend 
as “the first time a victim has ever filed a criminal suit against her ex for dis-
tributing revenge porn”). 
 373. See CITRON, supra note 370 (manuscript at 85–93). 
 374. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (find-
ing the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 
575–85 (2002) (scrutinizing the Child Online Protection Act); Reno v. ACLU, 
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trend runs towards increasing scrutiny—towards greater skep-
ticism about laws that ban information.375 Under Chief Justice 
John Roberts, the Supreme Court has been especially rigorous 
about evaluating laws that also made strong claims to tangible 
harms, from bans on crush videos involving the torture of ani-
mals,376 to limits on violent video games due to negative effects 
on minors,377 to tort liability for the deliberate infliction of emo-
tional distress upon a deceased veteran’s family during his fu-
neral procession,378 and to limits on government funding based 
on the need to reduce prostitution as a means of fighting the 
spread of HIV/AIDS.379 Even revenge porn, despicable as it is, 
does not fall within the few categories of unprotected expres-
sion that the government may regulate at will.380
Lastly, federal intellectual property law is also exempt 
from the CDA 230 safe harbor;
 Criminal law 
prohibiting non-consensual distribution may not survive First 
Amendment review. An IP-based regime is the safer, and likely 
more effective, option. 
381 criminal law has no compara-
tive advantage here. By contrast, state criminal law is pre-
empted by Section 230.382 California’s new revenge porn stat-
ute, for example, can create liability for people who initially 
distribute intimate media, but it cannot affect intermediaries.383
 
521 U.S. 844, 870–75 (1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act uncon-
stitutionally vague). See generally Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982) (“The Court has . . . ex-
pressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penal-
ties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”); 
Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Ap-
proach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1010–13 (2012) (dis-
cussing the Court’s treatment of statutes criminalizing speech). 
 
 375. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom–The Roberts Court, the 
First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 409–10 
(2013). 
 376. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2010). 
 377. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011). 
 378. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
 379. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 
2332 (2013). 
 380. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. But see Collins, supra note 375, at 416–37 
(agreeing that the Roberts Court has tightened categories of unprotected 
speech, but listing forty-three examples of types of speech that appear to be 
unprotected). 
 381. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012).  
 382. Id. § 230(e)(3).  
 383. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (2014). The law is relatively weak even 
for initial distributors. See Derek Bambauer, California’s New Revenge Porn 
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Overall, while using federal criminal law to combat non-
consensual distribution of intimate media may be beneficial, it 
is likely that this Article’s IP-based approach is even more so. 
B. PRIVACY LAW 
Privacy law dominates discussions around the production 
and misuse of intimate media. Intuitively, privacy doctrine has 
considerable appeal: there is something sordid and voyeuristic 
about the unauthorized viewing of people captured in intimate, 
vulnerable moments. However, privacy-based approaches share 
common failings, one theoretical and two practical. 
The theoretical failing of privacy law’s framework is that it 
does not take seriously the benefits of intimate media. Privacy, 
on this issue, is entirely about preventing harm to victims of 
unauthorized sharing.384 That impulse is admirable, but it ig-
nores another valuable consideration: structuring a legal re-
gime to encourage the production and sharing of intimate me-
dia among consenting partners. The virtue of this Article’s 
approach is that it addresses both: it creates a generative re-
gime for intimate media, while reducing harm by punishing it 
as copyright infringement. And, copyright law operates in prac-
tice like a privacy regime more often than either privacy or IP 
scholars might like to admit.385 Howard Hughes bought the 
copyright of a critical biography so that he might suppress it.386 
J.D. Salinger used copyright to quash quotations from his pa-
pers.387 Hulk Hogan sued to stifle his sex tape.388
 
Bill: Helpful-ish, INFO/LAW (Oct. 2, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/info 
law/2013/10/02/californias-new-revenge-porn-bill-helpful-ish. 
 In some con-
texts, copyright law can replace privacy law. It should do so 
 384. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 93 (highlighting the problematic trend of 
blaming victims of revenge porn privacy invasions); Kim, supra note 14, at 
1006 (pointing to privacy law as a primary source of remedies for online har-
assment victims). 
 385. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, The Dangerous Meme That Won’t Go Away: 
Using Copyright Assignments to Suppress Unwanted Content—Scott v. 
WorldStarHipHop, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 14, 2012), http:// 
blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/05/the_meme_that_w.htm (arguing “we 
need to vigilantly monitor the ecosystem for potential abuses” of copyright as a 
privacy mechanism). 
 386. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 
1966). 
 387. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 388. Brown, supra note 235. Hogan relied on the right of privacy in assert-
ing his claim. Id. 
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here, since it addresses both the virtues and demerits of inti-
mate media. 
The first practical hurdle for privacy doctrine is the im-
munity conferred by Section 230 on intermediaries. While the 
initial revelation of intimate media likely causes some harm, 
the greater harm comes from the public availability and ongo-
ing sharing of these media.389 Privacy laws, with the important 
exception of federal criminal ones,390 do not apply secondarily to 
websites, search engines, or other intermediaries.391 Privacy 
scholars typically respond by seeking to circumvent Section 230 
or by seeking to change it.392 Circumvention exists, but is rare. 
While there are cases successfully bypassing immunity based 
on privacy claims—typically, on the theory developed by the 
Ninth Circuit that the website has contributed to the develop-
ment of the content393—they are the exceptions that prove the 
rule.394 Alteration or repeal of Section 230 is a hardy perennial 
of privacy scholars and of state legislators.395
 
 389. As Mary Anne Franks writes, “the priority of most victims is to have 
the material removed, not to recover damages.” Franks, supra note 
 Thus far, efforts to 
alter the 230 safe harbor have proved politically nonviable, and 
if successful, would clearly come at some costs to intermediar-
362. 
 390. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2012). 
 391. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam) (finding privacy claims against search engines barred under Sec-
tion 230); Gavra v. Google, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-06547-PSG, 2013 WL 3788241, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) (“Congress gave [Google] a pass when it enacted 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.”); Goldman, 
Unregulating, supra note 172, at 59–61 (explaining Section 230’s immunity for 
websites that host user generated content such as Facebook). 
 392. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 13 (proposing an amendment to Section 
230); Kim, supra note 14, at 997 (“[T]he immunity granted to them under sec-
tion 230 . . . should not mean that Web site sponsors should be free from all 
liability for harm arising from their businesses.”). 
 393. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1165–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 394. See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 
836 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (“The immunity afforded by the CDA is not absolute and 
may be forfeited if the site owner invites the posting of illegal materials.”); 
Gauck v. Karamian, 805 F. Supp. 2d 495, 500 n.4 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (pointing 
to the defendant’s invocation of Section 230’s immunity provision). See gener-
ally Ardia, supra note 24 (analyzing courts’ treatment of Section 230 since its 
enactment). 
 395. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, State Attorneys General Want to Sue Innova-
tors “For The Children!”, TECHDIRT (July 24, 2013 1:08 PM), http://www.tech 
dirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130724/12345123927/state-attorneys 
-general-want-to-sue-innovators-children.shtml (describing proposed legisla-
tion to eliminate Section 230’s protections for Internet intermediaries). 
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ies and innovation.396
The second practical failing is that, even if Section 230 
were modified, privacy law may not be able to hold intermedi-
aries liable for non-consensual distribution of intimate media 
without running afoul of the First Amendment. The First 
Amendment generally protects expression against government 
efforts to ban redistribution of it, unless that expression falls 
outside the category of “speech.”
 Section 230 is a barrier, but it is one 
worth keeping. 
397 For example, a radio station 
that broadcasts an illegally wiretapped conversation may not 
be held liable, even though the person who initially taped the 
content could be prosecuted, and even when the radio station 
knew the taping was unlawful.398 A newspaper that publishes 
the name of a minor who was raped cannot be subject to dam-
ages under a shield law forbidding publication of the identities 
of victims of sexual offenses.399 A media outlet that identifies, in 
contravention of the law, a minor charged with murder cannot 
be prosecuted.400
While appealing at first blush, privacy law not only faces 
doctrinal challenges to achieving its ends, but those ends are 
 The trend line is clear: those who disclose ini-
tially can be held liable, but intermediaries who republish can-
not. This is a significant—if not insurmountable—hurdle for 
privacy law to overcome. 
 
 396. See, e.g., Goldman, Unregulating, supra note 172 (arguing that any 
new exceptions to Section 230 would undercut important benefits of the im-
munity); James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 48, 48–51 (2007), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/582 
.pdf (critiquing proposals to make search engines more accountable for harm-
ful web content); Lemley, supra note 172 (emphasizing the importance of safe 
harbors for Internet intermediaries and advocating a more unified rule to en-
sure protection). 
 397. The categories of expression that are not speech, and hence are be-
yond any constitutional check save viewpoint discrimination, are clearly closed 
at this point. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) 
(“[N]ew categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a leg-
islature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”). Re-
venge porn, or other nonconsensual intimate media, must therefore fit within 
one of the existing categories (such as obscenity), or its regulation must sur-
vive scrutiny. See id. at 2733–41. 
 398. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–22, 534–35 (2001). 
 399. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989); see also Cox Broad. Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471, 496–97 (1975) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth 
Amendment will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully pub-
lishing information released to the public in official court records.”). 
 400. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 105–06 (1979). 
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insufficient: they fail to take account of the benefits of consen-
sual sharing of intimate media. 
  CONCLUSION   
Blame smartphones. 
Whether Apple, Android, or Windows, smartphones today 
share two key traits: they have cameras, and they are net-
worked.401
Yet this Article comes to praise this change, not to bury it. 
Intimate media generate significant, important benefits for 
partners who use such images and video consensually. Recog-
nizing that value is the key insight into why intellectual prop-
erty law is best suited to tackle the challenges raised by non-
consensual distribution. Creating a right for identifiable sub-
jects of intimate media to block unconsented sharing and dis-
play effectively curbs infringement, empowers people, creates 
incentives for production, and avoids disturbing both the First 
Amendment and settled Internet law. Ultimately, this Article’s 
reform to copyright law enhances autonomy and generativity—
it enables us to meaningfully choose to whom we are exposed. 
 These characteristics explain the rise of amateur-
generated intimate media, and of its non-consensual distribu-
tion. The costs of production and distribution of this type of in-
formation—as with everything digital—have plummeted. Cre-
ating an explicit photo can be done easily, impulsively. And the 
device that snaps the photo can share it as well. The cost of dis-
tributing analog photos was an effective barrier to most non-
consensual sharing; it was simply too much work. Even digital 
cameras required a USB cable, a computer, and a separate In-
ternet connection before media could be distributed via the In-
ternet. But, as sexting proves, the smartphone has made inti-
mate media ubiquitous. 
  
 
 401. See generally Heather Kelly, How Much Better Can Smartphone Cam-
eras Get?, CNN.COM (July 16, 2013, 1:53PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/ 
16/tech/gaming-gadgets/smartphone-cameras-future (summarizing qualities of 
modern smartphones and emphasizing the importance of camera features). 
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Appendix A 
 
Proposed Text for Model Legislation 
 
A Bill 
 
To protect the consensual creation and sharing of intimate 
media. 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,  
 
Section 1. Short Title; Definitions. 
 
(a) This Act may be cited as the “Strengthening Healthy and 
Responsible Exchange of Intimate Media Act,” or the 
“SHARE IT Media Act.” 
(b) Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting the following: 
 
 A ‘work of intimate media’ is either a photograph (as 
defined herein under ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works’) or an audiovisual work that: 
1) Contains an image that captures the body of one or 
more living humans; 
2) Captures intimate information; and 
3) Enables one or more of the living humans captured 
in it to be reasonably identified, such as by 
capturing identifiable features or markings, by 
accurately labeling the human or humans, or by 
providing other identifying information in or 
accompanying the work. 
 
‘Intimate information’ is one or more of the following: 
1) Sexually explicit conduct, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
2256(2)(B)(i) & (ii);  
2) Depiction of a living human’s genitals or pubic area, 
as defined by the term “graphic” in 18 U.S.C. 
1466A(f)(3); or 
3) The exposed nipple or areola of a living human fe-
male. 
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Section 2. Rights in Intimate Media. 
 
Title 17 of United States Code is amended by inserting af-
ter section 106A the following: 
 
Section 106B. Rights in Intimate Media. 
 
(a) A living human captured in a work of intimate 
media, where that work includes intimate in-
formation pertaining to that person, shall have 
the rights 
1) To authorize the distribution of that work, or 
of any copies of it, and 
2) To authorize the display or performance of 
that work, or of any copies of it. 
 
(b) The rights in subsection (a) are independent of, 
and in addition to, the rights conferred by Sec-
tion 106. 
 
(c) Section 109(c) of this title does not apply to the 
rights in subsection (a) above. 
 
(d) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not 
be transferred. These rights may be waived if 
the owner of the rights in subsection (a) express-
ly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument 
signed by the owner. Such instrument shall spe-
cifically identify the work, and uses of that work, 
to which the waiver applies, and the waiver 
shall apply only to the work and uses so identi-
fied. 
 
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), 
a person shall not be liable for infringement of 
that provision for the display, distribution, or 
performance of a work of intimate media if: 
1) That person received the work, or a copy of 
it, from a living human captured in the work 
whose intimate information is captured in 
the work, and 
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2) Only that person views the performance or 
display of the work, or a copy of it. 
 
This subsection shall operate as an affirmative de-
fensive to liability for infringement. 
 
(f) Anyone who violates the rights in subsection (a) 
is an infringer of the owner of the rights. For 
purposes of Section 106B, a plaintiff must estab-
lish the following elements to establish liability 
for infringement: 
1) The work in suit is a work of intimate media; 
2) The plaintiff was captured in that work; 
3) That work contains intimate information 
pertaining to the plaintiff; 
4) A reasonable person could identify the plain-
tiff based on the work, and information ac-
companying it; and 
5) The defendant displayed, distributed, or per-
formed the work. 
 
For purposes of this subsection, ‘distribution’ in-
cludes making the work, or a copy of it, available, 
and does not require proof that anyone actually ob-
tained access to that work, or a copy of it. 
 
(g) For purposes of this subsection, an infringer who 
is a service provider, as defined in 17 U.S.C. 
512(k)(1)(B), infringes by distributing the work, 
or a copy of it, by hosting it (as defined in 17 
U.S.C. 512(c)), linking to it (as defined in 17 
U.S.C. 512(d)), or caching it (as defined in 17 
U.S.C. 512(b)), among other modes of distribu-
tion. 
 
(h) This Section shall apply only to works of inti-
mate media created on or after the effective date 
of the legislation enacting the SHARE IT Media 
Act. 
 
(i) A plaintiff who proves infringement, as defined 
in subsection (f), shall be entitled to the reme-
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dies in Sections 502–505, except as otherwise 
provided in this Section. 
 
(j)  A plaintiff who proves infringement, as defined 
in subsection (f), shall be entitled to recovery of 
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as defined 
in Section 505, unless the district court finds, 
and supports with specific findings, that such an 
award is not in the interests of justice. 
 
(k) A plaintiff who proves infringement, as defined 
in subsection (f), and who obtains an injunction 
as provided in Section 502(a), shall be entitled to 
removal and deletion of all digital copies of in-
fringing works under the defendant’s control, 
and to destruction of all physical copies of in-
fringing works under the defendant’s control, as 
provided in Section 503(a)(1), unless the district 
court finds, and supports with specific findings, 
that such relief is not in the interests of justice. 
 
(l) The first clause of Section 411 is edited to read 
as follows: 
 
“Except for an action brought for violation of the 
rights of the author under sections 106A(a) and 
106B(a)” 
 
(m) It is not an infringement of the rights in subsec-
tion (a) to perform, distribute, or display a work 
of intimate media if 
1) Such performance, distribution, or display is 
newsworthy, or 
2) The defendant has obtained express written 
consent from the plaintiff to the perfor-
mance, distribution, or display at issue. 
 
A newsworthy performance, distribution, or display 
must be one where the work of intimate media at is-
sue is a matter of public concern. To evaluate 
whether the work is a matter of public concern, a 
district court may consider the Restatement (Se-
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cond) of Torts, section 652D (1977), and related 
precedent. 
 
(n) Section 107 is not a defense to infringement of 
the rights in subsection (a). In a suit for in-
fringement of the rights in subsection (a), a dis-
trict court shall not consider Section 107. 
 
(o) Safe harbor -  
1) A service provider, as defined in 17 U.S.C. 
512(k)(1)(B), shall not be liable for monetary 
relief, or, except as provided herein, for in-
junctive or other equitable relief, for in-
fringement of the rights in subsection (a) by 
reason of the storage at the direction of a us-
er of material that resides on a system or 
network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider, if the service provider 
A. does not have actual knowledge that the 
material or an activity using the material 
on the system or network infringes the 
rights in subsection (a), and  
B. upon notification of claimed infringement 
as described in paragraph (2) herein, re-
moves or disables access to the material 
that is claimed to be infringing within 
five business days of receipt of the notifi-
cation. 
2) To be effective under this subsection, a noti-
fication of claimed infringement must be a 
written communication provided to the des-
ignated agent of a service provider that in-
cludes substantially the following: 
A. A statement that the complaining party 
is a person captured in the allegedly in-
fringing work of intimate media, or is au-
thorized to act on behalf of such person; 
B. The complaining party can reasonably be 
identified based on the infringing work 
or information accompanying it; 
C. The work of intimate media contains in-
timate information pertaining to the 
complaining party; 
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D. The complaining party did not consent in 
writing to the performance, distribution, 
or display of the allegedly infringing 
work of intimate media; or, the perfor-
mance, distribution, or display at issue 
exceeded the scope of the consent provid-
ed; 
E. The complaining party’s name and con-
tact information, including e-mail ad-
dress; or, if proceeding pseudonymously 
as provided in subsection (p), the com-
plaining party’s unique identifier and 
court information; 
F. The uniform resource locators (URLs) or 
locations under the service provider’s 
control where the infringing media can 
be located; and 
G. A statement that the information in the 
notification is accurate, under penalty of 
perjury. 
3) The limitations on liability established in 
this subsection apply to a service provider 
only if the service provider has designated 
an agent to receive notifications of claimed 
infringement described in paragraph (2), by 
making available through its service, includ-
ing on its website in a location accessible to 
the public, and by providing to the Copyright 
Office, substantially the following infor-
mation: 
A. The name, address, phone number, and 
electronic mail address of the agent. 
B. Other contact information which the 
Register of Copyrights may deem appro-
priate. 
 
The Register of Copyrights shall maintain a 
current directory of agents available to the 
public for inspection, including through the 
Internet, and may require payment of a fee 
by service providers to cover the costs of 
maintaining the directory.  
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4) A service provider receiving a notification of 
claimed infringement under this subsection 
must maintain the confidentiality of the noti-
fication, including by minimizing the number 
of people who can obtain access to the notifi-
cation, and by redacting identifying infor-
mation before sharing it with anyone who is 
not employed by the service provider or who 
is not an attorney retained by the service 
provider. 
5) The following rule shall apply in the case of 
any application for an injunction under sec-
tion 502 against a service provider that is 
not subject to monetary remedies under this 
subsection. A court may grant injunctive re-
lief with respect to a service provider only in 
one or more of the following forms: 
A. An order restraining the service provider 
from providing access to infringing mate-
rial or activity residing at a particular 
online site on the provider’s system or 
network. 
B. An order restraining the service provider 
from providing access to a subscriber or 
account holder of the service provider’s 
system or network who is engaging in in-
fringing activity and is identified in the 
order, by terminating the accounts of the 
subscriber or account holder that are 
specified in the order. 
C. Such other injunctive relief as the court 
may consider necessary to prevent or re-
strain infringement of copyrighted mate-
rial specified in the order of the court at 
a particular online location, if such relief 
is the least burdensome to the service 
provider among the forms of relief com-
parably effective for that purpose. 
6) Subject to paragraph (A), a service provider 
shall not be liable to any person for any 
claim based on the service provider’s good 
faith disabling of access to, or removal of, 
material or activity claimed to be infringing 
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rights in subsection (a), or based on facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity 
is apparent, regardless of whether the mate-
rial or activity is ultimately determined to be 
infringing. 
A. The limitation on liability described 
above in subsection (o)(6) shall not apply 
with respect to material residing at the 
direction of a subscriber of the service 
provider on a system or network con-
trolled or operated by or for the service 
provider that is removed, or to which ac-
cess is disabled by the service provider, 
pursuant to a notice provided under sub-
section (o)(2), unless the service provider 
I. takes reasonable steps promptly to 
notify the subscriber that it has re-
moved or disabled access to the mate-
rial; 
II. upon receipt of a counter notification 
described in paragraph (B), promptly 
provides the person who provided the 
notification under subsection (o)(2) 
with a copy of the counter notifica-
tion, and informs that person that it 
will replace the removed material or 
cease disabling access to it in 5 busi-
ness days; and 
III. replaces the removed material and 
ceases disabling access to it not less 
than 5, nor more than 7, business 
days following receipt of the counter 
notice, unless its designated agent 
first receives notice from the person 
who submitted the notification under 
subsection (o)(2) that such person has 
filed an action seeking a court order 
to restrain the subscriber from en-
gaging in infringing activity relating 
to the material on the service provid-
er’s system or network. 
B. To be effective under this subsection, a 
counter notification must be a written 
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communication provided to the service 
provider’s designated agent that includes 
substantially the following: 
I. A physical or electronic signature of 
the subscriber; 
II. Identification of the material that has 
been removed or to which access has 
been disabled and the location at 
which the material appeared before it 
was removed or access to it was disa-
bled; 
III. The material that was removed or 
disabled was newsworthy, as defined 
in subsection (m)(1); or that the sub-
scriber obtained express written con-
sent to the performance, distribution, 
or display of the work of intimate 
media at issue, as defined in subsec-
tion (m)(2); 
IV. The subscriber’s name, address, and 
telephone number, and a statement 
that the subscriber consents to the 
jurisdiction of Federal District Court 
for the judicial district in which the 
address is located, or if the subscrib-
er’s address is outside of the United 
States, for any judicial district in 
which the service provider may be 
found, and that the subscriber will 
accept service of process from the 
person who provided notification un-
der subsection (o)(2) or an agent of 
such person; and 
V. A statement that the information in 
the notification is accurate, under 
penalty of perjury. 
7) Any person who knowingly misrepresents 
material information in a notification of 
claimed infringement, as defined in subsec-
tion (o)(2), or in a counter notification, as de-
fined in subsection (o)(6)(B), shall be liable 
as follows: 
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A. To a service provider who received such a 
notification of claimed infringement, or 
counter notification, for the service pro-
vider’s actual damages, or for statutory 
damages of $750 per allegedly infringing 
work, at the service provider’s election; 
and 
B. To any person who uploaded, transmit-
ted, or submitted the allegedly infringing 
work at issue, in the case of knowing 
misrepresentation of a notification of 
claimed infringement; or, to any person 
who submitted the relevant notification 
of claimed infringement, in the case of 
knowing misrepresentation of a counter 
notification; for that person’s actual 
damages. 
 
A service provider who receives a notification 
of claimed infringement or a counter notifi-
cation containing material false information 
shall not be liable for infringement based on 
that notification or counter notification. 
